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Resar Krasulova: Globalization and Privatization

GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF FEDERAL
CORPORATE PROSECUTIONS:
THE PRESSURES ERODING FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Katarina Resar Krasulova*
ABSTRACT
Over the past several decades, our society has continued to
become even more globalized and interconnected. The dynamic put
increasing pressure on the fairness of criminal trials in domestic
courts. This Article discusses two recent phenomena that illustrate
this evolution and their impact on the defendants’ rights against selfincrimination: the globalization and privatization of the federal
prosecutions. Globalization is understood as the United States’
Government’s increased reliance on foreign authorities in prosecution
of cross-border crimes, while privatization denotes the Government’s
reliance on private actors in conducting investigations. Investigations
conducted by private entities and foreign governments, and the
evidence those investigations produce, raise significant constitutional
questions. Accordingly, this Article positions these phenomena and
recent case law side-by-side the Fifth Amendment precedent that
interpreted the constitutional protections against self-incrimination
expansively. To best preserve the values of the Fifth Amendment,
federal courts should evaluate compelled testimony with a flexible
evidentiary standard. This standard must be cognizant of the
changing prosecutorial landscape creating new contexts where
defendants may incriminate themselves, and of how can such
confessions shape the direction of investigations.

*

The author is a J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School. She also holds a B.A. from
Yale University and M.A. from the Graduate Institute in Geneva. I am thankful to
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1257

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2021], Art. 7

1258
I.

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

INTRODUCTION

The recent cases United States v. Allen 1 and United States v.
Connolly,2 both instances of federal prosecution of foreign citizens in
the U.S. courts in connection with the global LIBOR scandal,
demonstrated increasing pressures that the constantly evolving
methods of federal prosecution places on the Fifth Amendment
protections and evidentiary rules. The pressures include, but are not
limited to, cooperation with foreign governments and enforcement
agencies and outsourcing of the government’s investigative functions
to private actors. In Allen, the Second Circuit rejected the
government’s use of compelled testimonies of two British citizens
obtained by the British enforcement authorities pursuant to their
lawful power in the U.S. courts.3 In Connolly, the Southern District
Court for the District of New York found that the government
“outsourced” its investigative powers to Deutsche Bank’s private
counsel.4 The court found that the government substantially directed
the investigation, including the requests to interview Connolly’s codefendant Black in the Deutsche Bank’s London office. 5 Because
these interviews were fairly attributable to the government, they were
therefore compelled for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 6
This Article argues that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is broad and inclusive of protections
against the growing and changing landscape of federal prosecutions.
Statistical data and recent caselaw demonstrate the growth of
situations where the federal government cooperates with foreign
governments or private actors, and gains access to potentially
compelled testimony that had not been afforded constitutional
protections against self-incrimination.7
These processes are driven by what this Article refers to as
the globalization and privatization of federal prosecutions. To
understand the changing prosecutorial landscape and content of these
terms, the Article in Part II discusses the historical origins of the
1

864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017).
No. 16 Cr. 0370, 2019 WL 2120523 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019).
3
See infra notes 293-294 and accompanying text.
4
See infra note 335 and accompanying text.
5
See infra notes 327-330 and accompanying text.
6
See infra note 335.
7
See infra Part III.
2

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/7

2

Resar Krasulova: Globalization and Privatization

2021

GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION

1259

privilege against self-incrimination. The Article then addresses the
legal uncertainties about the scope of the permissible use of
compelled testimonies. The contours of permissible uses of
compelled testimony and the surrounding uncertainties become
important and as new actors—such as foreign governments or private
entities acting on behalf of the government described in this Article—
became sources of evidence for and agents under the direction of the
government.
The Article further points out that the self-incrimination
privilege is insufficiently protected by judicial inquiry that
categorically excludes certain types of compelled uses. A rigid
judicial standard cannot capture the complexity and constant change
that surround corporate prosecutions. Rather, this Article argues the
inquiry of whether a particular use of a compelled testimony is
permissible should be qualitative in nature, analyzing the instances of
compelled testimony individually and with due effect given to the
surrounding circumstances. This approach is more faithful to the
historical and precedential understanding of the Fifth Amendment.
Such an approach also allows the court to maintain the requisite
flexibility to assess novel situations arising from ever-evolving
globalized and privatized federal prosecutions.
In Part III, the Article explains how globalization increased
U.S. prosecutions of complex cross-border corporate crime, and, in
the process, strengthened the federal government’s cooperation with
foreign governments and corporations. When prosecuting complex
financial crimes that span continents, federal prosecutors increasingly
rely on cooperation with foreign governments and private businesses
(including and especially the very businesses under investigation) in
the process of gathering evidence. These trends have led to some
remarkable changes in federal corporate investigations, including, for
example, embedding federal prosecutors with foreign organizations,
and the federal government directing private counsel to conduct
internal investigations on behalf of the government.
Although cooperation with governments and corporations can
bring benefits to society in terms of better and more efficient
informational access and prosecution of guilty actors, it places
increasing pressure on the Fifth Amendment rights of mid-level
corporate employees who are often far removed from the corporate
wrongdoing, but often the most likely to get implicated in an
investigation. The recent caselaw introduced in Part IV shows that
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the federal courts recognized that the trends in globalization and
privatization of federal prosecutions have put pressure on the Fifth
Amendment protections. Neither foreign governments nor private
institutions are bound by the constraints of the U.S. Constitution on
gathering evidence, including the Fifth Amendment’s protection
against self-incrimination. In this new regime, foreign governments
turn over to the federal government testimony compelled abroad.
Corporations, on the other hand, provide internal documents and
interviews with employees that the government can use as a roadmap
for the investigation.
The Fifth Amendment commands that a defendant compelled
to testify must be granted an immunity that would put him in a
position as if he chose to invoke his right against self-incrimination
and not testify.8 Yet both situations are examples of where a
compelled testimony influences the direction of the federal
prosecution, without the requisite Fifth Amendment privilege.
Accordingly, this Article offers a novel outlook on
globalization and privatization of the federal prosecutions, viewing
them as overlapping and mutually reinforcing phenomena that arose
in response to the growth of complex multi-national financial crime
and that are constantly evolving, demanding a continuous and close
scrutiny to their effects on the employees’ rights.

II.

UNCERTAIN OUTER BOUNDS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
PRIVILEGE

Despite the importance of the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition
against self-incrimination in the American history and jurisprudence,
the judicial precedent in the past century has brought uncertainty and
confusion about the exact scope of the privilege. The history and
early Fifth Amendment jurisprudence reveal the central place of the
privilege in the American Constitution. 9 The privilege embodies the
quintessential American values that protect an individual from an
accumulation of power in the hands of the government.
However, towards the end of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court precedent on the scope of the privilege against selfincrimination created at least three relevant categories of unresolved
8
9

See generally Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
See generally id. at 444-45.
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tensions concerning: (1) the reach of the protection; (2) the scope of
permissible uses for compelled testimony in a grant of immunity; and
(3) the contours of actions attributable to the government.10 These
jurisprudential lacunae are particularly fraught in an age of parallel
international investigations and investigations that are closely
coordinated with banks’ private counsels. The courts developed
categorical tests in the attempt of trying to outline the contours of
permissible uses of compelled testimony uses under the Fifth
Amendment, which however only added to the complexity of the
inquiry.
The complexity and rigidity of the courts’ Fifth Amendment
inquiry, which focuses on categorizing uses of compelled testimony
into evidentiary and non-evidentiary, make it unfit for the fast
developing, continents-spanning, and multi-actor federal prosecutions
that developed in the past thirty years. 11 Every year, there are more
opportunities and novel avenues for a governmental exposure to
compelled testimonies. 12 Neither a categorical inquiry that rules out
a class of compelled uses nor the government’s taint teams can
sufficiently protect the Fifth Amendment privilege. To counteract the
change, the courts need to be attentive to these changes in federal
prosecutions that reach the American courtrooms and subject the
instances of foreign and private cooperation to a heightened scrutiny.
In this effort, the accompanying inquiry under the Fifth Amendment
must focus on the effects of a governmental compelled testimony use,
while considering the surrounding circumstances such as the
powerful institutional and governmental actors informing the
prosecution, and their relationship to the individual.
A.

The History of the Fifth Amendment

The Fifth Amendment commands that “no person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” 13
The origins of the privilege are often dated by the scholars to the

10

See infra Parts II, IV.
See infra Parts II.C., II.D.
12
See infra Part III (for a description of prosecutorial trends in the increasingly
interconnected and globalized world).
13
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11
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second half of the seventeenth century.14 In those times, the English
Court of Star Chamber and the ecclesiastical courts were known for
extracting coerced confessions using a host of nowadays-illegal
means, including torture. 15 The truth and falsity of the allegation
were not as important to the English authorities as extracting a
confession from the defendant—a process that attested to the
oppressive and unbridled power of the sovereign against which the
defendant had no protection. 16
A defendant in the English courts of that era not only did not
have rights against coercive self-incrimination, but often did not even
know the charges he faced. 17 The need for a right against a coercive
power of the state was ever so strong in a system where power of the
state went unchecked. The individual was often powerless in the
hands of the state. Such was the experience of “Freeborn John
Lilburne” whom the scholars often credit with being the first to
publicly advocate, on his own behalf, for his right against selfincrimination.18 Lilburne was arrested under charges of importing
“factious and scandalous books” into England and brought in front of
the Privy Council of the Star Chamber in 1637. 19 He refused to take
the ex officio oath that required him to answer questions asserting the
recognized right of a freeborn Englishman not to accuse himself. 20

14

See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (1994); Richard McMahon,
Kastigar v. United States: The Immunity Standard Redefined, 18 CATH. LAW. 314
(1972).
15
See Richard McMahon, Kastigar v. United States: The Immunity Standard
Redefined, 18 CATH. LAW. 314, 317 (1972).
16
Langbein, supra note 14, at 1048. The beyond reasonable doubt standard of
proof necessary for a criminal conviction today was not articulated in English law
until the last decade of the eighteenth century. Id. The government’s and courts’
assumption was not that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty, but perhaps
something along the lines if innocent, then it will somehow show. Id. at 1057.
Furthermore, the accused’s defense was complicated by the fact that he or she had
to spend almost all the time pending trial in jail. Id. at 1057-58.
17
Id. at 1058. The English law forbade the defendant from obtaining a copy of the
indictment pre-trial and at the trial. In fact, the court clerk merely summarized the
indictment to the defendant at the trial. Id.
18
Joseph L. Rauh Jr., The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination from John Lilburne
to Ollie North, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 405-06 (1988).
19
Id. at 405.
20
Id.
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The English authorities did not take well to Lilburn’s
arguments and sentenced him to a punishment. 21 Lilburne continued
to protest and publicly campaign against his sentence. He produced
numerous tracts and pamphlets on the topic and eventually
successfully asserted his right against coerced self-incrimination in
1649 before an Extraordinary Commission of Oyer and Terminer
composed of many distinguished legal authorities of the day. 22 At
last, Lilburne’s life-long effort fighting against his sentence and
defending the right of a freeborn man not to accuse himself bore its
fruits. The English Parliament not only indemnified Lilburne in
1649, but also recognized the right against self-incrimination as a
defense to the ex officio oath, but as an accepted principle in common
law criminal procedure. 23 The privilege against self-incrimination
since then became part of the English Common Law. 24
But what does a privilege unused, or privilege designed to be
used ineffectively amount to in a criminal trial? Not too much,
according to early historical sources on the newly recognized right
against self-incrimination. A seminal study of pamphlet reports of
London trials from the 1670s—about 20 years after the recognition of
the privilege against self-incrimination—to the mid-1730s did not
show a “single case in which an accused refused to speak on asserted
grounds of privilege, or in which he makes the least allusion to a

21

Id.
See Neill H. Alford, Jr., The Right of Silence, 79 YALE L.J. 1618, 1621 (1970)
(reviewing LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968)).
23
Id. at 1621.
24
Id. (“Lilburne had made the difference. From this time on, the right against selfincrimination was an established, respected rule of the common law, or more
broadly, English law generally.”). See also McMahon, supra note 14, at 317 n.17.
The ideological foundation of the right against self-incrimination can be dated to
earlier religious traditions. For example, Judaic law recognized the principle before
modern times. Id. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT:
THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 433-34 (1968). A maxim that “a man
cannot represent himself as guilty, or as a transgressor” was an essential part of
procedure in the Rabbinic courts in the ancient times. Id. See Akhil Reed Amar &
Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause,
93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 896 (1995). The medieval law of the Roman church equally
adhered to the maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum or “no one is obliged to
accuse himself.” Id. This maxim was taken to mean that a duty to reveal sins at
confession did not require having to come forward and accuse oneself in court. Id.
22
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privilege against self-incrimination.”25 The explanation for the
curious under-use of the newly recognized right is not obvious from
what happened at trial, but rather from what happened before the
trial. By the time the accused reached the courtroom, he would have,
wittingly or unwittingly, implicated himself enough times to render
the privilege worthless.26 The criminal system that came into being
by the end of the eighteenth century in England was marked by a
“self-evidently schizophrenic criminal procedure.” 27 In this system,
legal and legislative authorities created a trial right that they
destroyed in the pre-trial.28 The lessons from the eighteenth century
English attempt to embrace the right against self-incrimination
remain pertinent even today. They speak of the importance of
safeguarding the right at all stages of criminal procedures.
Insufficient protection of the privilege in an early stage of
investigation can lead to an incrimination of the accused that
permeates the entire investigation and could therefore render any
subsequent protective safeguards futile.
An additional factor inhibiting effective use of the selfincrimination privilege by defendants was the dearth of involvement
of counsel and the structure of the criminal proceedings. An attorney
could advise defendants how to be strategically invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination. Thus, the defendant bore the double
burden of having to testify and being his or her own defense counsel,
which made use of the right against self-incrimination difficult, if not

25

Langbein, supra note 14, at 1066. Other sources also confirm that there was still
a presumption placed on the accused to say why he was not guilty. See id. at 1049
n.7, 1066 n.83 (citing J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 16601800 (1986)). If the accused did not speak in his defense, the courts often held
invocation of silence as admission of guilt. Id. at 1047.
26
Id. at 1061. During this time, inquisitorial tactics were routine in pre-trial stages.
Id. For example, the Marian pretrial procedure, named after The Marian Committal
Statute of 1555, routinely included practices such as transcribing anything that the
defendant said after apprehension as “material to prove the felony” and required an
officer collecting evidence to testify against the accused. Id. at 1059-61.
27
Id. at 1062.
28
Id. at 1059-62.
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impossible.29 But the defense counsels over time became more
involved with the court, gradually taking over the defense role
previously carried by the defendant “speaking.”30 Importantly, the
defense counsel also began to strategically silence the defendants and
suppress their testimonial role in all stages of the criminal
proceedings.31
The English legal tradition carried over across the ocean to
the newly established colonies. By the end of the eighteenth century,
the American colonies began adopting the privilege against selfincrimination.32 The governors of the first American colonies
brought to the New Continent European interrogation techniques and
coercive practices—including torture.33 The colonies looked into the
English law for guidance, and adopted common law privileges
against coercive self-incrimination as means of checking these
governmental abusive practices. 34 Each of the original thirteen states
recognized the privilege through common law or express
constitutional provision, and the self-incrimination was also adopted
as the fifth constitutional amendment in 1791. 35 Nowadays, all but
two American states explicitly recognize the privilege in their state

29

Id. at 1069-71. Several important transformations of the criminal law and related
judicial proceedings occurred in the eighteenth century: (1) The concept of
production burden, and that the prosecution bore it, slowly started to take hold; (2)
at the same time, the presumption of innocence was formulated, which encouraged
the defense counsel to silence the accused in order to have the prosecution build the
case; (3) the law of criminal evidence formed, introducing objections against
certain types of evidence and questions; (4) the judge decreased in importance as
counsel for prosecution while defense took over witness examination; and (5) these
developments cumulatively facilitated and further required greater use of defense
counsels at trials. Id.
30
Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1092 (1994). The socalled “accused speaks” trial was prevalent in England in the fifteenth century. Id.
at 1089. The model aimed at securing a defendant’s confession and prohibited
representation by counsel. The “accused speaks” trial model was also prevalent in
the American colonies from the settlement until the end of the eighteenth century.
Id. at 1091-92.
31
Langbein, supra note 14, at 1071.
32
Jefferson Keenan, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony and the
Increased Likelihood of Conviction, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 173, 175 (1990).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
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constitutions.36 With this constitutionally recognized right it also
became clear that the government retained the power to compel a
testimony, but only upon a grant of an immunity that would wholly
preserve the privilege against incrimination.37
The privilege against self-incrimination, as pointed out by the
Supreme Court, reflects many fundamental American values and
aspirations.38 The Supreme Court held that the privilege stands for
the “unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt,” as well as “fear
that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses.”39 According to the Supreme Court, the sense
for fair play dictating “a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown
for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with
the individual to shoulder the entire load.”40
The values that buttress the policies are the “respect for the
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life,” and
that “the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a
protection to the innocent.”41 These values, albeit admittedly
undefined,42 became a part of the constitutional fabric despite the
surrounding lack of clarity about how to best protect them, and
contributed to proliferation of the Court’s opinions and scholarly
36

McMahon, supra note 14, at 317. The two states that do not recognize the
privilege against self-incrimination in their constitutions are Idaho and New Jersey,
but both have statutes that recognize the right to the same effect. Id. at n.17 (citing
ERWIN GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955)).
37
See Keenan, supra note 18, at 176 (Congress enacted the first federal immunity
statute in 1857, which provided the witness could not be prosecuted for any acts
connected to his compelled testimony in exchange for providing the government
with previously inaccessible testimony.).
38
See generally Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972).
39
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
40
Id. (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 317
(McNaughton ed., 5th ed. 1961)).
41
Id (quotations omitted).
42
See Ronald J. Allen, M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained
and Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 244 (2004) (stating
that the values are “striking in their vacuity and circularity.”). Justice Murphy,
remarked on the topic that “the law and the lawyers . . . have never made up their
minds just what [the Fifth Amendment] is supposed to do or just whom it is
intended to protect.” Id. at 245.
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opinions without a resolution. 43 It is against these strong aspirations,
but definitional uncertainty that the global and national events
impacting the Fifth Amendment unfold.
B.

Twenty-First Century Challenges to The
Application of The Fifth Amendment

Maintaining the protections and furthering the values of the
Fifth Amendment became increasingly challenging as national,
international, and government-private interactions became more
frequent and complex. The familiar situation in which a federal
prosecutor interrogates a defendant who asserts her Fifth Amendment
privilege became replaced by a foreign sovereign compelling a
testimony sought to be used in a U.S. prosecution. 44 Alternatively,
the prosecution may not even be carried out by a prosecutor. 45
Instead, a private institutional counsel appointed to carry out an
internal investigation can subject an employee to an interview under a
threat of job termination.46 A government, often directing the private
counsel in the course of a corporate internal investigation and
conditioning the firm’s and counsel’s cooperation on favorable
settlement terms, can subsequently use this compelled testimony in
the domestic prosecutions. 47
In the first instance, the U.S. enforcement authorities face a
situation where a defendant was compelled by a foreign nation that
conducts a parallel investigation. According to the Second Circuit in
United States v. Allen,48 the Fifth Amendment protections against
self-incrimination extend to situations where a U.S. prosecuting
authority uses a testimony compelled by a foreign sovereign. 49 The
See id. For example, Amar and Lettow remark that “[t]he Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is an unsolved riddle of vast proportions, a Gordian
knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights,” while William Stuntz concludes that “[i]t
is probably fair to say that most people familiar with the doctrine surrounding the
privilege against self-incrimination believe that it cannot be squared with any
rational theory.” Amar & Lettow, supra note 24, at 857.
44
See infra Part IV.A (discussing United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.
2017)).
45
See Part IV.B (discussing United States v. Connolly, No. 16 CR. 0370, 2019 WL
2120523 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019)).
46
See id.
47
See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
48
864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017).
49
Id. at 101.
43
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second instance applies to situations where the government engages
and directs a private institution’s investigations so that the actions of
the institution become de facto the government’s action. This
occurred in United States v. Connolly,50 where the court found that
the government’s lack of independent investigative action and
substantial directing of the Deutsche Bank’s private investigation
through its counsel were attributable to the government. 51
Both Allen and Connolly address novel situations surrounding
application of the Fifth Amendment privilege. But even prior to
Allen and Connolly, the courts have struggled with defining the exact
scope of the privilege. In the past century, the United States’ courts
transitioned from an absolute requirement of immunity that forbade
any subsequent prosecution to a limited immunity requirement.52
The Supreme Court gradually restricted the absolute immunity
established by Counselman v. Hitchcock53 to apply only in the
context of the interactions between the state and federal
government.54 In the second half of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court then abrogated Counselman’s absolute immunity in
compelled testimony situations in United States v. Kastigar.55 The
Court in Kastigar allowed subsequent prosecution of a compelled
witness provided that the prosecution did not rely on the witness’s
compelled testimony or on evidence directly or indirectly derived
from such testimony.56
However, the Court in Kastigar did not clarify exactly what is
the direct or indirect evidence that is prohibited or what evidence is
admissible under the new immunity standard.57 Lower courts and
scholars differed in their views on the types of testimonial uses
afforded protections under the Fifth Amendment as interpreted by
Kastigar, resulting in uncertainties for defendants.58
The
uncertainties about the scope of the Fifth Amendment protections,
including questions about the scope of the immunity in new contexts
or permissibility of certain evidentiary uses, surrounded the recent
50

No. 16 Cr. 0370, 2019 WL 2120523 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019).
Id. at *10.
52
See supra notes 50-52; see also infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
53
142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892).
54
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964).
55
406 U.S. 441 (1972).
56
Id. at 448-49.
57
See infra notes 118-26.
58
See infra Part II.D.
51
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Allen and Connolly decisions.59 To understand the decisions, one
must consider both the current changing trends in global and national
prosecutions involving the self-incrimination privilege and the
historical context, and subsequent caselaw, in which the privilege
developed.
The analysis of the current and historical trends coalesces
around the central purpose of the of the Fifth Amendment privilege
that seeks to prevent the government from using its power to place a
witness into the “cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or
contempt.”60 The Anglo-American legal tradition shows that the
protections granted by the Fifth Amendment are essential to prevent
governmental abuses and to honor a person’s dignitary rights to lead
a private life without unfettered interference by the government.
C.

Government Immunity Grants and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination Explained

The developments in the scope of the Fifth Amendment
immunity were accompanied by a host of complex and confusing
jargon. It is important to decipher the meaning of the shorthand to
both understand the relevant court decisions and consider the
overlapping, and often uncertain meaning of this terminology.
The most well-known immunity types recognized in criminal
trials and statutes of the past century are (1) absolute immunity, also
known as transactional immunity, and (2) use-plus-fruits immunity,61
also referred to as use and derivative immunity. 62 The distinction
between absolute and use-plus-fruits immunities can be illustrated by
59

See infra Part IV.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
61
Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) (describing the use-plus-fruits
doctrine in). In Harrison, the Court found that the Petitioners coerced testimony at
an earlier trial was inadmissible in later proceedings because it was the “fruit of the
illegally procured confessions.” Id. at 221. To arrive at the conclusion, the Court
perused language from the Fourth Amendment case, Wong Sun v. United States, to
show that the Petitioner’s testimony had not been “obtained ‘by means sufficiently
distinguishable’ from the underlying illegality ‘to be purged of the primary taint.’”
Id. at 226 (quoting 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). See Anonymous, Standards for
Exclusion in Immunity Cases after Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171, 174
n.19 (1972).
62
See generally Hanah Metchis Volokah, Congressional Immunity Grants and
Separation of Powers: Legislative Vetoes of Federal Prosecutions, 95 GEO. L.J.
2017, 2021-24 (2007) (discussing transactional, use, and derivative use immunity).
60
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an example. Let’s consider the following statement: “After the
murder, I hid the gun under a tree in the park.” 63 The broadest
immunity standard — transactional or absolute immunity — would
afford a witness immunity for any prosecution arising from the event.
The prosecution cannot prosecute using the testimony or the gun they
subsequently found. But the prosecution also cannot prosecute the
witness based on accomplice testimony who the prosecution
encountered en route to the crime scene. Any prosecution related to
the occurrence is barred under transactional immunity.
On the other hand, under a use-plus-fruits conception of
immunity in the murder and hidden gun situation, a prosecutor again
cannot use against the witness the compelled testimony or the gun to
which the testimony pointed. But if a prosecutor finds the gun in an
unrelated way — say, for example, based on an information from a
testimony of an accomplice or by stumbling upon it by walking her
dog in the park—the gun becomes admissible evidence in a criminal
case against the witness.64
The past hundred years was marked by developments in U.S.
courts that changed the breadth of the protections under the selfincrimination clause. The courts shifted from viewing immunity
grants as absolute or transactional, guaranteeing an individual
freedom from subsequent prosecution. The majority of the courts
view the Fifth Amendment as demanding only an undefined version
of a restricted immunity. The more restrictive view, unlike at the
beginning of the twenty first century, allows in certain circumstances
for a subsequent prosecution of a compelled witness. 65
The Supreme Court’s landmark case that first defined the
scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege was Counselman v.
Hitchcock.66 Counselman was a dealer in grain questioned in front of
a grand jury about whether he obtained certain grain rebates in
violation of Interstate Commerce Commission regulations. 67
Counselman refused to answer these questions on the ground that the
answers would incriminate him. 68 The questioning authority, the
63

See id. at 2021.
See id. at 2021-23.
65
See infra text accompanying note 76.
66
142 U.S. 547 (1892).
67
Id. at 549-50. The federal regulation made it a criminal offense for a railroad’s
officer or agent to grant shippers and dealers a lesser rate than the tariff or open
rate. Id.
68
Id.
64
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Interstate Commerce Commission, offered Counselman a statutory
immunity in exchange for his testimony. 69 This immunity, however,
would not foreclose Counselman’s future prosecution based on
evidence indirectly obtained on the basis of the testimony. 70 The
immunity grant would only disallow prosecutors from directly using
Counselman’s testimony—also known as use immunity.71
Given the limited protections offered by the statutory
immunity, Counselman again refused to answer the court’s
questions.72 Counselman’s refusal led the court to adjudge him to be
in contempt of the court and sentenced him to imprisonment and a
fine.73
The Supreme Court on review considered whether the
statutory immunity sufficed to safeguard Counselman’s constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination.74 The Court critically observed
that the immunity offered to Counselman “would not prevent the use
of [Counselman’s] testimony to search out other testimony to be used
in evidence against him or his property.” 75 Such immunity therefore
could not prevent “the obtaining and the use of witnesses and
evidence which should be attributable directly to the testimony he
might give under compulsion.”76
The Court found that the
government’s derivative use of Counselman’s testimony may lead to
a conviction where otherwise, if Counselman simply refused to
answer, he could not be convicted. 77 Thus, the Court held that the
69

Id.
Id. at 585-86.
71
Id. at 560.
No pleading of a party, nor any discovery or evidence obtained
from a party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding in this
or any foreign country, shall be given in evidence, or in any
manner used against him or his property or estate, in any court of
the United States, in any criminal proceeding, or for the
enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture: provided, that this
section shall not exempt any party or witness from prosecution
and punishment for perjury committed in discovering or
testifying as aforesaid.
Id. at 560-61.
72
Id. at 552-53.
73
Id.
74
Id. 564.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
70
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statutory immunity allowing such use was not “co-extensive with the
constitutional provision”78 because it “does not supply a complete
protection from all the perils against which the constitutional
prohibition was designed to guard . . . .”79
However, the Court in Counselman did not hold that the useplus-fruits immunity statute would suffice to protect the defendant’s
privilege against self-incrimination.80 Instead, the Court held that for
an immunity statute to survive a constitutional review, it must “afford
absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which
the question relates.”81
Not too long after Counselman and in direct response to the
Court’s holding, Congress enacted a statute that codified absolute,
also known as transactional, immunity from prosecution in a
compelled testimony situation. 82 The newly codified immunity was
soon challenged and upheld by the Supreme Court in Brown v.
Walker.83 After Walker, absolute immunity came to be the standard
for numerous federal immunity statutes,84 and became an essential
78

Id. at 565.
Id. at 586.
80
See id. at 585-86.
81
Id. (emphasis added).
82
Compulsory Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443-44 (1893) provided:
That no person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from
producing books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and documents . . .
on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence,
documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him or
subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no person shall be prosecuted or
subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce
evidence . . . .
Id.
83
161 U.S. 591 (1986). The Court split five-four with Justices Field, Shiras, Gray,
and White dissenting. Id. at 610-38. Justice Field in a separate dissenting opinion
wrote that “[t]he amendment also protects him [Walker] from all compulsory
testimony which would expose him to infamy and disgrace, though the facts
disclosed might not lead to a criminal prosecution.” Id. at 631 (Field, J.,
dissenting). The Court refused to endorse the broader interpretation of the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination that would protect from infamy,
disgrace and the expense of employing a counsel and providing a defense. Id. at
597.
84
See J.A.C. Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 549,
552-53 (1957). The language from the immunity statute enacted in response to
Counselman v. Hitchcock became the standard for numerous federal statutes. Id.
(discussing 142 U.S. 547 (1892)).
79
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part of the Unites States’ “constitutional fabric.” 85
The
Counselman’s immunity standard was not systematically revisited by
the Court until the early 1970s.86
But new questions about Counselman’s implications arose in
1964 when the Supreme Court considered the scope of immunity
grants in a multi-jurisdictional context. There, the Court considered
whether the Amendment applies to the states. Finding that it does,
the Court next decided how much immunity is required in parallel
state and federal prosecutions.
The case in question was Malloy v. Hogan,87 where the
Supreme Court held that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is binding on the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 88 Malloy was arrested and jailed for
gambling in Connecticut but he later pled guilty and was released on
probation.89 About sixteen months into his guilty plea, a Connecticut
court ordered Malloy to testify about these gambling and other
criminal activities, but Malloy refused to answer on the ground that
the answers would violate his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. 90 However, a Connecticut state court held that the
Amendment’s privileges do not extend to Malloy in a state
proceeding.91 The Supreme Court reversed the Connecticut’s
Supreme Court of Errors’ ruling, holding that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination is available to a witness in a state
85

Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956).
Id. at 424. Arguably, the transactional immunity doctrine withstood the greatest
challenge in a McCarthy era espionage investigation. In Ullman, the Petitioner,
Ullman, refused to answer questions before a grand jury about his membership in
the Communist party. Id. Ullman claimed that such admission would lead to a
potential risk of his job, passport, and union membership. Id. at 430. Yet the
Supreme Court upheld the transactional immunity standard despite the potential
grave consequence for Ullman. Id. at 439.
87
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
88
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964). See Harry T. Quick, Constitutional
Law—Self-Incrimination—A New State Standard, 15 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 797,
797 (1964). The mechanism of expanding the constitutional rights protections
through the Fourteenth Amendment was characteristic of the era when Malloy was
decided. The decision followed reasoning outlined in a series of civil rights cases
that include Gitlow v. New York, Mapp v. Ohio, and Gideon v. Wainwright. Id.
(citing 268 U.S. 652 (1925); 367 U.S. 643 (1961); 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
89
Malloy, 378 U.S. at 1.
90
Id. at 3.
91
Id.
86
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court.92 In this holding, the Supreme Court stressed the essential
values of the American legal system that is “accusatorial,” not
“inquisitorial,” which compels the government to establish guilt by
evidence independently obtained—be it compulsion to selfincrimination or compulsion by torture. 93
But the decision in Malloy also opened previously unexplored
questions about how immunity grants interact on the state and the
federal prosecution levels.94 On one hand, federal prosecutors could
not ignore the state grants of transactional immunity, because that
would render the attempted protection by state immunity grants
futile. On the other hand, the authorities could not be prevented from
prosecuting a party who was previously granted a state transactional
immunity,95 because such disablement would be arguably in violation
of the Supremacy Clause.96
The Supreme Court addressed the problem of the overlapping
federal and state sovereign authority grant on the very same day as
Malloy.97 Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority in Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor,98 held that an
immunity grant in one jurisdiction is binding on another. But the
Court introduced a twist to the application of multi-jurisdictional
immunity—the state and federal immunity grants differed in scope.
The Court held that “a state witness may not be compelled to
give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless
92

Id.
Id. at 7.
94
See, e.g., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). Before Malloy, the
Court consistently held that a federal statute is capable of granting immunity to
state proceedings. See also United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 150 (1931).
But a state has no power to give immunity from federal prosecutions.
95
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 92-93 (1964).
Justice White summarized the Court’s holding in Murphy by stating that “the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is nullified ‘when a witness ‘can
be whipsawed into incriminating himself under both state and federal law even
though’ the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to
each.’” Id. He also pointed to the undesirable consequences of requiring an
absolute immunity. For example, an absolute immunity grant would invalidate
immunity statutes in fifty states because the state authorities would lack the power
to confer such immunity from federal prosecution. Id. at 93-94. The rule would
thereby cut deeply and significantly into traditional and important areas of state
authority and responsibility in our federal system. Id.
96
See Anonymous, supra note 61, at 173.
97
Id.
98
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
93
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the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner
by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against
him.”99 The Court in Murphy also held that while the grant of
immunity in the prosecuting jurisdiction is absolute, or transactional,
the immunity in the parallel prosecuting jurisdiction is sufficiently
use-plus-fruits.100 This compromise protected an individual from a
coerced game of catch with the parallel prosecuting state and federal
authorities, where she would incriminate herself under an immunity
grant in a state proceeding, only to be prosecuted on the basis of the
testimony in the federal proceeding, and it also allowed for the
existence of parallel state and federal proceedings. 101
The Court in Murphy did not reject absolute immunity in the
first instance, but it resolved that a non-compelling jurisdiction (in
that case, a parallel federal prosecution) does not have to be held to
the same high standard of immunity. 102 The non-compelling
jurisdiction still cannot rely on the compelled testimony (use), or the
fruits derived thereof, but it can prosecute on independently obtained
evidence.
But the Court never answered what happens when the
questioning and prosecuting jurisdictions are the same. Thus, readers
and commentators of Malloy asked whether the decision
foreshadowed the later restriction of the immunity requirement in a
single jurisdiction context from a transactional immunity to a useplus-fruits one, or whether it was merely a federalism compromise.
Diverse and conflicting opinions surfaced about how to read
Counselman, Malloy, and Murphy together. Some commentators
questioned whether the ruling in Murphy plainly diluted
Counselman’s rule that required that both federal and state legislation
only grant use-plus-fruits immunity.103 Others believed that there
99

Id. at 79.
Id.
101
Justice White noted in Murphy that a grant of absolute immunity would lead to
unwanted results in both state and federal prosecutions where either (1) widespread
federal immunization would prevent States from having the power and means of
obtaining information necessary for state law enforcement, and where (2) the
Federal government would effectively become the only power with capacity to
offer immunity in exchange for compelling testimony. Id. at 93.
102
See Alan D. Singer, State Grants of Immunity—The Problem of Interstate
Prosecution Prevention, 58 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 218, 218 (1967).
103
See Note, Counselman, Malloy, Murphy, and the States’ Power to Grant
Immunity, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 336, 339 (1966).
100
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was a one-directional difference in the state and federal immunity
grants—state witness under state immunity grant does not receive
absolute immunity from federal prosecution, but a federal witness
under a federal immunity statute does. 104 The lower courts were no
less perplexed about the type and the scope of constitutionally
required immunity for compelled testimony. 105
Until 1970, transactional immunity was the standard for
federal immunity statutes.106 But amidst the divergent interpretations
of immunity coexistent with the Fifth Amendment in the aftermath of
Malloy and Murphy, the Warren Court began to gravitate towards a
requirement of use-plus-fruits standard instead of relying on the
Counselman’s absolute immunity.107
Congress seized this opportunity where courts began to waver
on the immunity standard and passed an act that would aid law
enforcement by easing the requirements for evidence gathering. 108
The new statute—Title II of the organized Crime Control Act of
1970109—repealed the existing federal immunity statutes that
mandated that a compelling authority grants a transactional
104

Id. at 340.
Compare In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32, 37 (7th Cir. 1971), rev’d, 406 U.S. 952
(1972) (interpreting Murphy as not restricting Counselman and the scope of Fifth
Amendment, but as “extend[ing] the fifth amendment’s requirement that a
defendant’s involuntary statements never be used in any manner against him”),
with Byers v. Justice Ct. for Ukiah Judicial Dist. of Mendocino Cty., 458 P.2d 465,
472 (1969), vacated sub nom. Gardner v Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968)
(recognizing that “an individual raising a valid claim of privilege need not be given
complete immunity from prosecution in order to be compelled to testify”). See also
Anonymous, supra note 61, at 171 n.19.
106
See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (recognizing Piccirillo
v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 at 571 n.11 (1971) and Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254
U.S. 71, 73 (1920) as minor exceptions to this rule). Justice Brennan, in his
dissenting opinion in Piccirillo, specified that Congress has written more than forty
transactional immunity provisions into various federal statutes. Piccirillo, 400 U.S.
at 571. Brennan also pointed out that the majority of the state immunity statutes
provide for transaction immunity at that time, “even though the States were not
subject to the full effect of the Fifth Amendment until 1964.” Id. at 571-72.
107
See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). For example, in Marchetti,
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, found the use-plus-fruits restriction to
a federal registration statute is “in principle an attractive and apparently practical
resolution.” Id. at 58. See also Anonymous, supra note 61, at 174 n.19.
108
See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 922, 222-23.
109
18 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6005 (1970).
105
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immunity,110 and replaced it with a statute that demanded use-plusfruits immunity.111
Congress reasoned that the new statute codified the “userestriction immunity concept of Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission”112 based on what “Congress judged to be the
conceptual basis of Counselman . . . that immunity from the use of
compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom is coextensive
with the scope of the privilege.” 113 But if the Constitution mandated
that immunity be transactional, Congress could not lower the scope
of the immunity grant to a use-plus-fruits protection barring a
Constitutional amendment. Thus, facing this new statute, the
Supreme Court had to reevaluate its decision in Counselman and
consider once again whether the new immunity sufficiently
safeguarded the Fifth Amendment privilege.
At the time when the Act was passed, Congress may have
been reading between the lines of Murphy in claiming that use-plusfruits immunity is constitutionally permissible. Only Justice White’s
concurring opinion in Murphy lends the Congress’s view direct
support. White argued that the privilege against self-incrimination is
secured when federal officials are barred from introducing the
testimony, or evidence derived from such testimony, in the
evidence.114 He wrote that “[t]he constitution does not require that
110

See Anonymous, supra note 61, at 174.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 in the relevant parts states that:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a
proceeding before or ancillary to—(1) a court or grand jury of the
United States, (2) an agency of the United States, or (3) either
House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House, and the person
presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an
order issued under this title, the witness may not refuse to comply
with the order on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled
under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived
from such testimony or other information) may be used against
the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the
order.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (emphasis added).
112
H.R. REP. NO. 91-1188, 91ST CONG., 2d Sess. 4017-18 (1970).
113
S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 51-56, 145 (1969); H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 42 (1970).
114
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 101 (1964).
111
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immunity go so far as to protect against all prosecution to which the
testimony relates, including prosecutions of another government . . .
.”115 Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Kastigar disagreed
with such interpretation of Murphy’s majority decision. Douglas
argued that Murphy was a decision about federalism and not the
scope of the immunity coexistent with the Fifth Amendment. 116 In
Douglas’s view, Murphy squarely aimed to solve the question of
interjurisdictional immunity and it said nothing about the scope of the
immunity within the same jurisdiction.117
But the Kastigar majority, the next important Supreme Court
decision on the scope of the immunity, viewed Murphy and
Counselman in a different light when addressing the Petitioners’
challenge to Congress’s new immunity statute. Just as in Murphy,
the Petitioners in Kastigar were summoned to testify in front of a
federal Grand Jury.118 The Government granted the Petitioners a
statutory immunity,119 but the Petitioners claimed the immunity grant
was insufficient to replace their constitutional privilege against selfincrimination—they
demanded
absolute
immunity
from
120
prosecution.
The Supreme Court rejected Petitioners’ demand,
holding that the offered use-plus-fruits of immunity sufficiently
protects their Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.121 In so finding, the Court held that Murphy’s dualjurisdiction reasoning in adopting use-plus-fruits immunity applies to
a single jurisdiction context, too. 122 Yet, the Court in Kastigar did
not expressly overrule Counselman. Instead, the Court reasoned that
Counselman’s requirement of transaction immunity was merely an
example of a statute that would sufficiently protect an individual’s

115

Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
See Lawrence Rubenstein, Immunity and the Self-Incrimination Clause, 2 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 29, 32
(1973) (“The Murphy decision was a product of the Court’s handling of a practical
question of federalism; it did not broaden the duty to testify.”).
117
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 464 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
118
Id. at 442.
119
18 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6005 (1970).
120
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 449.
121
Id. at 462.
122
Id. at 453.
116
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Fifth Amendment rights,123 reducing Counselman’s transactional
immunity requirement to a mere suggestion and a dictum. 124
The Kastigar Court specifically addressed the Petitioners’
concern that derivative-use immunity will be inadequate to protect a
witness from a host of potential incriminating uses of testimony. 125
The Kastigar Petitioners argued that “[i]t will be difficult and perhaps
impossible . . . to identify, by testimony or cross-examination, the
subtle ways in which the compelled testimony may disadvantage a
witness . . . .”126 The Court dismissed this concern noting that the
language of the immunity statute mandated a sweeping proscription
against direct or indirect use of a testimony, which prevents using a
compelled statement as an investigatory lead. 127
The differences between the lower courts post Kastigar
concerning the scope of the prohibition against the derivative use of
testimony suggests that the Court’s conclusion may have been
premature. The Court did not address the subtle, indirect, and often
untraceable ways in which a compelled testimony may very well
steer the direction of an investigation. 128 Does it matter that the
123

The Court in Kastigar recounted that the statute in question in Counselman only
protected the defendant from direct use of the testimony, but not from evidence
searched out on the basis of the testimony. Id. at 450. The Court reasoned that
Counselman’s clear statement that “a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford
absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to which the question
relates” means something else than can be understood from the plan meaning of the
statute. Id. at 451 (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892)).
The Court in Kastigar reasoned that that the majority in Counselman stated that a
statute “must afford absolute immunity;” they merely introduced one example of a
statute that was sufficed to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 454.
124
Id. at 455.
125
Id. at 459.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 459-60.
128
This use is referred to as “non-evidentiary.” But the difference between indirect
evidentiary and non-evidentiary is difficult to capture in practice. See infra Part
II.D. The Kastigar Court suggested that any shaping of the investigation based on
compelled evidence constituted indirect prohibited use. But what then constitutes
non-evidentiary use that alters the shape of the investigation? Some scholars
conclude that “a non-evidentiary use is really an indirect evidentiary use that is yet
to be proven.” See Douglas A. Turner, Nonevidentiary Use of Immunized
Testimony: Twenty Years After Kastigar and the Jury Is Still Out, 20 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 105, 130 (1992). Lower courts are usually divided on the issue of evidence
admissibility along the lines of evidentiary and non-evidentiary. See supra note
114.
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prosecution unfolds in a certain sequence because of a compelled
testimony? What if the thought processes of a cross-examining
prosecutor are shaped by an exposure to a compelled testimony and
subsequently influence his line of questions? Furthermore, it
remained difficult to discern the line between evidentiary and nonevidentiary use once an investigator was exposed to the evidence. 129
A prosecutor can easily work his way backward to establish
independent ways of obtaining evidence. 130 In such instances, the
prosecution’s proof that evidence was derived from sources
independent from the compelled testimony often becomes an exercise
in prosecutorial good faith, rather than a reliable method of inquiry
worthy of safeguarding a constitutional right.
But the Court in Kastigar did not find that construing useplus-fruits immunity as sufficient to protect the Fifth Amendment
privilege leads to an increased reliance on prosecutorial good faith. 131
The Court held that the burden placed on the prosecution was to show
that the evidence came from sources “wholly independent of the
compelled testimony.”132 According to the Kastigar Court, the
prosecutorial burden provides sufficient safeguards against
prosecutors “working backwards” to establish an independent source
of evidence.
But the Court did not consider the relative ease with which a
prosecutor can find the corroboration for a desired result despite the
prosecutorial burden to establish an independent source of evidence.
There is a strong informational asymmetry between the prosecution
and the defendant. The prosecution controls and shapes the case,
including selection of the relevant parties. The prosecution also has
vast subpoena powers, and it can request oceans of evidence from
almost unlimited sources. Once the prosecution knows what it is
looking for, it is not hard to establish an alternative source of
evidence amongst the copious evidence previously gathered.
It is thus an easier burden for the prosecution to shoulder to
prove an alternative source for evidence once it knows of the
evidence than it is for the defendant to establish that the prosecution
worked its way backwards to establish an independent source of the
evidence. Indeed, in this instance, there is no reliable way to
129

See infra Part II.D.
See infra note 242.
131
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
132
Id.
130
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distinguish what evidence was derived independently and what was
arrived at under direct or indirect influence of a compelled
testimony.133
D.

The Dispute Over The Permissible Uses Of
Compelled Testimony

In the decades after the ruling in Kastigar, the lower courts
puzzled over the scope of Kastigar’s prohibition against any
prosecutorial use134 of immunized testimony “in any respect.” 135 The
Kastigar Court described the new immunity standard by contrasting
it with the deficiencies of a use immunity standard 136—use immunity
only could not prevent derivative use. 137 Kastigar’s proscription
against the use of compelled testimony appears to be sweeping at first
blush—it prohibits “direct or indirect, [use] of the compelled
testimony and any information derived therefrom.”138
But Kastigar’s prohibition on direct or indirect use, without
more, does not provide precise guidance for where to draw the line in
enforcing the standard. This is especially true of indirect evidence: at
what point is evidence sufficiently removed from the testimony that it
does not violate a witness’s right against self-incrimination? Does
reading a testimony by a prosecutor create a per se taint? Are
strategic decisions influenced by a compelled testimony an
impermissible use? Because of Kastigar’s ambiguities and the
inherent difficulties in enunciating and applying the proscription
133

See infra notes 237-48 and accompanying text on the use of filter and taint
teams.
134
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
135
Id. at 453.
136
Id. The Court found that mere use immunity did not prevent the “use of [the
compelled] testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against
him.” Id. at 450. Nor did it prevent the “use of witnesses and evidence which
should be attributable directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion . . .
[or] use of compelled testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a knowledge
of the details of a crime, and of sources of information which may supply other
means of convicting the witness or party.” Id. at 454.
137
“[B]ecause the immunity granted was incomplete, in that it merely forbade the
use of the testimony given and failed to protect a witness from future prosecution
based on knowledge and sources of information obtained from the compelled
testimony.” Id. at 454 (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 437
(1956)).
138
Id. at 460.
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against indirect use in particular, the lower courts have struggled to
consistently define the scope of Kastigar’s immunity. Accordingly,
because the definition of the non-evidentiary use is vague, most
courts define it by example. 139 Some examples of non-evidentiary
use include prosecutors utilizing the testimonial knowledge to: (1)
bring an investigation; (2) focus and general shaping of the
investigation; (3) refuse to plea bargain; (4) interpret evidence; (5)
plan cross-examination; or otherwise prepare trial strategy.140
The courts further divided on whether all or any of the types
of non-evidentiary use are coexistent with the privilege against selfincrimination.
The leading case that interprets Kastigar as
proscribing non-evidentiary uses of a compelled testimony is United
States v. McDaniel.141 McDaniel was a president of a North Dakota
bank who was subpoenaed to appear before both federal and state
grand juries to answer questions about his work as a president.142 He
first testified in front of a grand jury under a grant of immunity,
divulging a long list of his crimes.143 A federal prosecutor later
received an immunized copy of McDaniel’s testimony unaware that it
was, in fact, immunized, and 144 the he indicted and convicted
McDaniel, who later appealed. 145 The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed McDaniel’s conviction even though the evidence
adduced against him at trial was, according to the prosecution,
obtained from wholly independent sources.146 The Court interpreted
Kastigar’s proscription on “any use, direct or indirect,” as prohibiting
any prosecutorial use of testimony. 147 The Court noted that “if the
immunity protection is to be coextensive with the Fifth Amendment
privilege, then it must forbid all prosecutorial use of the testimony,
not merely that which results in the presentation of evidence before

139

See Turner, supra note 128, at 113.
Id. (citing United States v. Rivieccio, 919 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2852 (1991)). But see United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524,
1531-32 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that government’s incorporation of knowledge
into indicting or the trial constitutes indirect use).
141
482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir.1973).
142
Id. at 307.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 311.
147
Id.
140
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the jury.”148 The Court also remarked that the prosecutor’s reading of
the compelled testimony “could not be wholly obliterated from the
prosecutor's mind in his preparation and trial of the case.” 149
The Court in McDaniel decided that Kastigar prohibits and
non-evidentiary use of compelled testimony, including mere reading
of the immunized testimony that shaped prosecutorial thought
process.150 The Court in McDaniel held that where, as in this
circumstance, the prosecutor thoroughly prepared for a trial not
knowing that the testimony is compelled, the prosecution’s burden
under Kastigar was “insurmountable.”151 But McDaniel stopped
short of saying that that prosecutorial familiarity with a compelled
testimony established per se taint. Other courts have since followed
McDaniel in prohibiting non-evidentiary use that may have
tangentially influenced the trial strategy or prosecutor’s thinking.152

148

Id.
Id. at 312.
150
Id. According to the Court, non-evidentiary use includes “assistance in focusing
the investigation, deciding to initiate prosecution, refusing to plea-bargain,
interpreting evidence, planning cross-examination, and otherwise generally
planning trial strategy.” Id. at 311.
151
Id.
152
United States v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir.1983) (stating possible nonevidentiary uses, the Court concluded the record did not show that the prosecution
and the defendant remained in substantially the same position as if defendant had
never testified); United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716, 722 (3d Cir. 1980)
(suggesting that the prosecutor’s access to the immunized testimony that provides
psychological motivation he would otherwise lack could constitute impermissible
use); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 859-60 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (suggesting
that a Kastigar violation occurs not when a prosecutor’s limited exposure has a
mere tangential influence on his thoughts about a case, but rather when he makes
significant non-evidentiary use of the testimony); United States v. Hsia, 131 F.
Supp. 2d 195, 201-02 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that Kastigar and North prohibit nonevidentiary uses of immunized testimony); United States v. Smith, 580 F. Supp.
1418, 1421 (D.N.J. 1984) (stating that the government has an “‘affirmative duty’ of
showing that it did not and will not exploit the immunized testimony in more
subtle, elusive ways”). But see United States v. Slough, 641 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (potentially distinguishing North). The Court in Slough held that “[n]either
Kastigar nor North states that non-evidentiary uses of immunized statements are
barred.” Id. at 553. Rather, the Court stated that many uses that may have been
lumped under “non-evidentiary use” in North or in the District Courts decision in
Slough, such as refreshing memories of a witness with evidentiary testimony or
evidence presented to the grand jury thar was discovered by the immunized
testimony, were indirect uses prohibited by Kastigar. Id. at 554.
149

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

27

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2021], Art. 7

1284

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

But several other courts rejected McDaniel’s proposition that
non-evidentiary use of a compelled testimony falls within Kastigar’s
proscription. These courts argue that immunity must only protect
against evidentiary uses. The First Circuit rejected the view that “all
non-evidentiary use necessarily violates the Fifth Amendment.” 153
The First Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit that prosecution
should be solely because “’immunized testimony might have
tangentially influenced the prosecutor's thought processes in
preparing the indictment and preparing for trial.’” 154 But at the same
time, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that “certain nonevidentiary uses of immunized testimony may so prejudice the
defendant as to warrant dismissal of the indictment . . . .”155 The
Second Circuit, on the other hand, explicitly rejected tangential nonevidentiary uses,156 yet it never rejected other non-evidentiary uses. 157
By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit, comparing its decision to
those in McDaniel and Semkiw, held that “the privilege against selfincrimination is concerned with direct and indirect evidentiary uses
of compelled testimony, and not with the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.”158 But the Eleventh Circuit’s definition of “evidentiary”
use is ambiguous—the court insisted that evidentiary use under
Kastigar encompasses “investigatory” uses that could be reasonably
considered non-evidentiary.159 Just as the Eleventh Circuit, the
Seventh Circuit, too, stated that “the mere tangential influence that
privileged information may have on the prosecutor's thought process
in preparing for trial is not an impermissible ‘use’ of that

153

United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1989).
Id. at 17-18 (quoting United States v. Mariani, 851 F.2d 595, 600 (2d Cir.
1988)).
155
Id. at 17.
156
United States v. Mariani, 851 F.2d 595, 600 (1988).
157
In United States v. Schwimmer, the Second Circuit cited with approval both the
Eighth Circuit’s decision in McDaniel and Third Circuit’s decision in Semkiw, in
warning the government about potential hazards of non-evidentiary uses that may
“assist the prosecutor in focusing additional investigation, planning, crossexamination, or otherwise generally mapping a strategy for retrial.” 882 F.2d 22,
26 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing U.S. v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir.1973) and
Semkiw, 712 F.2d at 895).
158
United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1531 (11th Cir. 1985).
159
See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing United
States v. Hampton, 775 F.2d 1479, 1490–91 n.53 (11th Cir.1985)).
154
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information.”160 The Seventh Circuit further stated that “[t]here is no
question that Kastigar bars not only evidentiary use of compelled
testimony but also non-evidentiary, or derivative, use of the same.” 161
Even through the differences among the circuits as to what
types of evidence fall within the constitutionally proscribed immunity
grant are often described as a split, 162 there may be more similarities
amongst the circuits than is apparent. The circuits that rejected the
non-evidentiary standard did not do so categorically, but they left
open the possibility that certain non-evidentiary uses could amount to
a Kastigar violation. Second, the definitions of non-evidentiary uses
are inconsistent across the circuits. Some circuits find certain
evidence use that could be reasonable considered a non-evidentiary
use, and thus outside the scope of Kastigar’s protection, an indirect
use that is allowed.163
A review of circuits’ practices shows that it matters more
whether the use is merely tangential or whether it has a discernible
bearing on potentially incriminating evidence, than whether use is
“evidentiary” or not. The linguistic exercise of defining what use is
direct or indirect, evidentiary or non-evidentiary, has not succeeded
in producing a workable definition as to either type of uses. And no
court was willing to completely foreclose itself from the possibility
that no non-evidentiary uses will not be within Kastigar’s
prohibition. Therefore, the courts’ inquiry in determining the scope
of the Kastigar immunity should move away from a categorical
inquiry about whether a use is evidentiary or not to a functionalist
and qualitative inquiry. The confusing categorization of what is
evidentiary and non-evidentiary use should be avoided altogether.
Only a qualitative inquiry that considers the implications of a
testimonial use can capture the most relevant question in Kastigar
and Murphy—whether the witness is “in substantially the same
position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a

160

United States v. Bolton, 977 F.2d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting United
States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir.1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
161
United States v. Cozzi, 613 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2010).
162
See generally CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 89:10 (3d ed. 2021); CRIMINAL
PRACTICE MANUAL § 8.11(c) (4th ed. 2020); see also Turner, supra note 128, at
116.
163
See Hampton, 775 F.2d at 1490–91 n.53.
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state grant of immunity.”164 Kastigar did not describe what particular
types of evidence are excluded. Instead, the Kastigar Court asked
what effect the use has on the foregone self-incrimination right. The
immunity, according to the Court, is a mere exchange token, no more
or no less protective than the scope of the Fifth Amendment itself.
And given the important historical role that the amendment played in
the history of the common law and the United States’ substantive
law,165 the Court’s protective measures to safeguard the right should
always lean toward a greater margin of protection.
A broad view of the Kastigar immunity is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Hubbell.166 In Hubbell,
the Court determined that the scope of an immunity grant is large—it
includes the production of documents in response to a subpoena
where the defendant had to identify the documents, making extensive
use of “the contents of his own mind.”167 The Supreme Court refused
to separate the production of documents from its testimonial aspect,
likening assembling of the subpoenaed documents to “telling an
inquisitor the combination to a wall safe,” and unlike “being forced to
surrender the key to a strongbox.”168 The Court further regarded the
Government’s view of the “act of production as a mere physical act
that is principally nontestimonial in character,” and that can be
“entirely divorced from its ‘implicit’ testimonial aspect,” “anemic”
and divorced from the realities of the act of production in this case. 169
In Hubbell, the Supreme Court refused to separate the act of
production from its testimonial character, emphasizing the qualitative
aspects of the inquiry that determines the scope of the Fifth
Amendment protection for an immunized testimony: “The
testimonial aspect of respondent's act of production was the first step
in a chain of evidence leading to this prosecution.” 170 Justice
164

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 457 (1972) (quoting Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964)).
165
See supra Parts II.A, II.B.
166
530 U.S. 27 (2000).
167
Id. at 43 (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)).
168
Id. A combination conveys the contents of one’s mind and is therefore
testimonial. On the other hand, a key, in these circumstances, does not reveal
contents of one’s mind and is therefore not testimonial and protected within the
scope of the Fifth Amendment. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9
(1988).
169
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43.
170
Id. at 28-29.
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Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, reaffirmed in his concurrence such
broad reading of the self-incrimination privilege based on the historic
use and precedent: “Fifth Amendment privilege protects against the
compelled production not just of incriminating testimony, but of any
incriminating evidence.”171 The Justices went so far as to state that in
a future case, they would be willing to reconsider the scope and
meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause. 172

III.

THE CORPORATE PROSECUTION TRENDS: WHO IS BEING
PUNISHED?

The rise, peak, and aftermath of the financial crisis in the
increasingly globalized world brought important changes to the way
the government interacts with private institutions. 173 A decade of
large-scale settlements was succeeded by an increased demand for
individual prosecutions, tightening the link between the government
and banks nationally and internationally. 174
The increased cooperation between the government and
corporations in turn increased the government’s access to information
about employees, without the corresponding increased protections for
the corporate employees. 175
The government’s individual
prosecutions moreover did not punish the heads of companies. 176
Rather, they targeted the more ordinary rank-and-file employees, 177
who are becoming the least protected in the world where cooperation
between large companies and governments strengthens.178
A decade after the financial crisis and despite increased
financial regulation since the 2008 recession, the Department of
Justice’s (“DOJ”) white-collar prosecutions fell to their lowest in
twenty years, reflecting a broader steadily declining trend from the
171

Id. at 49 (Thomas, J. & Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
173
See supra notes 168-173 and accompanying text.
174
See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
175
See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.B.
176
See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
177
See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
178
See infra notes 196-99, 202-11; see also infra Part IV.B.
172
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past few years.179 But the trend is more complicated than a simple
trend in the rise and the fall of prosecutions. The past three decades
in corporate prosecutions were marked by many important changes.
Starting in the 1990s, when prosecuting corporations was a relatively
novel phenomenon, and progressing to the 2000s when the DOJ
revolutionized using large-scale settlements in corporate prosecutions
with deferred and non-prosecution agreements. 180
At the same time, the number and scope of large-scale crossborder actions that drive the corporate investigations and subsequent
settlements grew. The United States became increasingly involved
with its foreign counterparts in investigating the multi-national
crimes that affect the United States, often engaging in parallel crossborder investigations. The statistics show that in 2017 the Criminal
Division’s Fraud Division of the DOJ accrued “over 50 pending
parallel investigations in over 40 different jurisdictions and involving
over 50 different foreign regulatory and law enforcement
authorities.”181 For example, “the U.S. Department of Justice
revealed that bribery cases now routinely involve four or five
countries.”182 The five largest bribery settlements in 2016 and 2017
not only concerned foreign companies, but were conducted in
cooperation with foreign authorities.183
The United States
prosecutors are now additionally becoming embedded in international
organizations and even within sovereign government’s enforcement
bodies.184
These large cross-border investigations exert great pressure
on the companies under investigation to settle as evidence and
witnesses become available internationally, and the governments’
179

See White Collar Prosecutions Fall to Lowest in 20 Years, TRACREPORTS (May
24, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/514/. The declining trend continued
in year 2019. Id.
180
See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE
WITH CORPORATIONS 1-18 (2014) (providing an overview of the changing approach
towards corporate prosecution during the 1990s through 2000s).
181
Emily T. Carlson, The (not-so) “Brave New World of International Criminal
Enforcement”: The Intricacies of Multi-Jurisdictional White-Collar Investigations,
84 BROOK. L. REV. 299, 311 (2018).
182
Evan Norris & Alma Mozetic, How Enforcement Authorities Interact, GLOB.
INVESTIGATIONS
REV.
OF
THE
AMS.
(Aug.
20,
2018),
https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/insight/the-investigations-review-of-theamericas-2019/1173281/how-enforcement-authorities-interact#endnote-001.
183
Id.
184
See infra note 247.
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forces join in targeting crime. Many of such large-scale prosecutions
ended in even larger settlements. In 2015, an astounding number of
banks—eighty to be exact—settled cases brought against them by the
government using plea agreements or deferred–prosecution
agreements.185 Banks represented about half of all prosecution
agreements in 2015, and these settlements paid the majority of the $9
billion of prosecutions’ fees the government levied that year. The
fees included some of the famously large settlements such as: $625
million paid by Deutsche Bank in an antitrust case, $641 million paid
by Commerzbank, or $156 million paid by Crédit Agricole in money
laundering and export violation cases. 186 The settlements appeared to
be advantageous agreements between the government and the banks.
The government collected large fees, and the companies, facing
potentially ruinous lawsuits, eagerly cooperated and paid large
settlements.187
Almost for a decade since the financial crisis, the government
has been levying hefty financial fees through the official settlement
policy.188 Despite these penalties, the Department of Justice faced
criticism for the lack of individual accountability in corporate
prosecution cases189 and for the recidivism committed by these
financial institutions,190 which signaled to the public that despite the
penalties, little has changed inside the banks. This criticism
185

Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, 126 YALE L.J. 33, 37
(2016).
186
Id.
187
See infra Part III.A.
188
In 2015, corporations paid record fines exceeding $9 billion in penalties to
federal prosecutors; $7 billion from this sum was paid by banks. Overall, over $22
million in penalties have been paid to the federal prosecutors from 2011 to 2015
and over $15 billion was paid just in the last five years of the time period from
2011 to 2015. See Garrett, supra note 185, at 35-36.
189
Brandon L. Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
109, 112 (2020).
190
See Garrett, supra note 185, at 42. For example, Barclays entered into a
deferred prosecution agreement in 2010, a non-prosecution agreement in 2012, and
a guilty plea pending. Id. Crédit Suisse signed a deferred prosecution agreement in
2009 and a plea agreement in 2014. Id. HSBC entered a non-prosecution
agreement in 2001. Id. UBS entered into a deferred prosecution agreement in
2009, a non-prosecution agreement in 2011, a non-prosecution agreement in 2012,
a guilty plea by a subsidiary in 2013. Id. Wachovia entered a deferred prosecution
agreement in 2010 and a non-prosecution agreement in 2011. Id. Lloyds agreed to
a deferred prosecution agreement in 2009 and a deferred prosecution agreement in
2014. Id.
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prompted the former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates to issue a
Memorandum outlining a new focus on individual prosecutions. 191
This renewed concentration on individuals remained, according to the
Trump Administration, a focal point of the DOJ’s prosecutions. 192
The increased focus on individuals brought greater
cooperation with the banks, nationally and internationally, where on
one side the government is hoping to convict culprits to assuage the
public criticisms, and on the other side, the banks are trying to do
anything that could win favorable treatment from the government.
Indeed, the DOJ emphasized the importance of “true”
corporate cooperation that provides “evidence against” the “culpable
individuals.”193 The incentives for the private institutions to
cooperate to their utmost are also clear.
The 2015 Yates
Memorandum stated that “for a company to receive any consideration
for cooperation . . . the company must completely disclose to the
Department all relevant facts about individual misconduct. 194 The
corporations are therefore incentivized to turn over the most
information possible about their employees at the government’s
request with the hope of securing favorable settlement conditions.

See Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, the Deputy Att’y Gen. on Individual
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, Dep’t of Just. (Sept. 9, 2015).
192
Matt Zapotosky, Sessions: Focus on Violent Crime Doesn’t Mean Lax
Enforcement for White-collar Offenses, WASH. POST (April 24, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-focus-onviolent-crime-doesnt-mean-lax-enforcement-for-white-collaroffenses/2017/04/24/d36d4034-2906-11e7-be51-b3fc6ff7faee_story.html. Former
Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated that individual white-collar prosecutions
remain DOJ’s priority despite widely advertised focus on violent offenses, and drug
and immigration violations. Id. Subsequently, the Deputy Attorney General Rod J.
Rosenstein re-iterated that prosecuting corporate individuals remains an important
deterrent for wrongdoing. See Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at
the American Conference Institute’s 35th International Conference on the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2018) (“Under our revised policy, pursuing
individuals responsible for wrongdoing will be a top priority in every corporate
investigation. . . . But the deterrent impact on the individual people responsible for
wrongdoing is sometimes attenuated in corporate prosecutions. Corporate cases
often penalize innocent employees and shareholders without effectively punishing
the human beings responsible for making corrupt decisions.”).
193
Marshall L. Miller., Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at the
American Conference Institute’s 35th International Conference on the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2018).
194
See Yates, supra note 191, at 3.
191
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The Connolly case from 2018, discussed later in this Article,
was not the first case where the U.S. government offered lenient
treatment in exchange for the company’s zealous cooperation or
waiver of an employee’s privilege. Already in 2006 in United States
v. Stein I,195 Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York
strongly reproached the government for coercing the accounting firm
KPMG into interfering with its employees’ Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.196
Kaplan found that the DOJ’s policy memo followed in this case—the
Thompson Memorandum—interfered with the defendants’ Fifth
Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to
counsel because it allowed the government to judge KPMG’s
cooperation on its decision whether pay the attorneys’ fees.197 In the
second opinion issued in Stein, the court held that the KPMG
employees who had been threatened with termination of their jobs
and payment of legal fees if they did not speak to the government,
made their statements under coercion directly attributable to the
government.198
Despite the government’s resolve to prosecute individuals, the
overall white-collar prosecutions declined, but the individual
prosecutions amounted to a mere fraction of all government whitecollar prosecutions. The composition of the convicted white-collar
wrongdoers offers a telling picture of who is prosecuted. It is not the
corporate chief executive officers (“CEOs”) or executive managers.
From 2001 to 2014, the prosecutors in the United States
entered into 306 deferred prosecution agreements with companies—
only 104 included individual prosecutions, amounting to 414
individuals prosecuted. 199 Of the individuals charged, the majority
did not consist of CEOs and other higher-up corporate officers, but
rather middle managers and individuals with low-ranking corporate
positions. Out of 414 individual prosecutions from 2001 until 2013,
only one-third included individuals who held positions with
195

435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
See id.; Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul:
Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 53, 54 (2007).
197
Bharara, supra note 196, at 98.
198
Id. at 98-99.
199
The 104 criminal cases were accompanied by 414 individual prosecutions. See
Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789,
1802 (2015).
196
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significant managerial responsibilities, twenty-six were CEOs,
thirteen were presidents, twenty-eight were chief financial officers,
and fifty-nine were vice presidents.200
Moreover, the growing cooperation between the banks and
the companies created an environment where the prosecutors have a
remarkable access to companies’ internal information about the
employees. But the government’s access did not lead to holding the
most powerful and the guilty individuals—corporate executives and
top managers— accountable. On the contrary, the individuals who
are often marched into courtrooms are not the ones directing
misconduct, or even those with the most knowledge of the crimes.
The higher-ups are valuable sources of knowledge who can aid the
prosecutors to obtain several convictions, which could in turn
dampen the public criticism. They are therefore more likely to
receive a government plea offer for their cooperation.
The
arrangements also raise a separate concern that the higher-ups get
favorable deals in exchange for throwing the mid-level employees
“under the bus.”
In addition to the settlement and cooperation policies, the
courts have also aided the expansion of the government and corporate
cooperation at the expense of the employees’ rights. According to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States,201 the
corporation, not the individual, retains attorney-client and work
product privilege.202 The corporation can lift this privilege when the
government so demands and grant the government access to the
information it otherwise could not reach. 203 And more often than not,
the government rewards such helpful corporate cooperation. 204 The
corporate employees often speak with a company’s in-house counsel
200

Id. at 1802-03.
449 U.S. 383 (1981).
202
Id. at 390. This is to the contrary of the Supreme Court’s otherwise protective
attitude towards the attorney-client privilege against government encroachment.
See generally Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998)
(stating that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote public
observance of the law by “full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and the administration of justice” and refusing to pierce the privilege after the
attorney’s death).
203
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95.
204
See Yates, supra note 191; see also Garrett, supra note 199, at 1844-45.
204
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95.
201
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before the government comes knocking on the door.205 In such
interviews, the employee does not receive any constitutional
protections, and she often has no legal representation, and may not
even be aware that anything she will say may result in a criminal
liability.206 Frequently then, the individual unwittingly incriminates
herself because the company’s policies oblige her to speak with the
corporate counsel, and the incriminating evidence is then turned over
to the government.207
. Companies commonly have “talk or walk” policies that
allow for termination of employees who do not follow them.208 Such
corporate interviews, however, may not adequately safeguard
employees’ constitutional rights where it is the government that
directs the investigation. Instead, a corporation may be “bending
over backward and kissing [the government’s] tush to satisfy the
government””209 in a hope of a favorable settlement while the
employee faces the catastrophic choice between being interrogated de
facto by the Government without any self-incrimination guarantees or
the termination. These pressures, together with the government’s
outsourcing of investigative powers, facilitate erosion of the Fifth
Amendment rights of the employees caught in the middle, where the
large banks settle, and the top management gets a favorable
cooperation agreement.

205

Garrett, supra note 199 at 1824-25.
Id.
207
Id.
208
See Garrett, supra note 199, at 1825. See also Sigal P. Mandelker et al.,
Employee Rights: The US Perspective, GLOB. INVESTIGATIONS REV. (Jan. 4, 2017),
https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/chapter/1079306/employee-rights-the-usperspective; see also United States v. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (finding that the KPMG employees, who had been threatened with
termination of their jobs and payment of legal fees if they did not speak to the
government, made their statements under coercion directly attributable to the
government).
209
Judge McMahon’s remark on account of Deutsche Bank’s cooperative effort
with the U.S. government in the LIBOR prosecutions. Transcript of Record at 361,
l. 14-15, United States v. Connolly, No. 16 Cr. 0370, 2019 WL 2120523 (S.D.N.Y.
May 2, 2019).
206

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

37

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2021], Art. 7

1294

TOURO LAW REVIEW
A.

Vol. 37

The Privatization of the Government’s
Investigations

The companies’ cooperation with the government in hope of
gaining a favorable settlement plays out against the backdrop of the
enormous pressure that the United States government places on the
companies to induce cooperation. 210 The potential costs for the
government and the corporations are great. Subsequently, the
settlement agreements between the government and companies create
a co-dependent relationship between the government and the
companies. The government faces public pressure to prosecute
corporate individuals in a tumultuous era of financial scandals, and
the companies are vigorously avoiding the “fatal prospect” of
indictment.211 Admittedly, potential losses of big corporations hardly
elicit public sympathy. Still, the consequences for a business that
fights a case all the way to a trial can be ruinous. Such consequences
impact the companies’ willingness to cooperate with aim to settle as
soon as possible. Even though a trial may seem negligible for a
multi-billion-dollar corporation, it is not so because a corporation is
not affected solely by potential costs and fees associated with a trial.
The good reputation of a firm amongst investors perpetuates its
success. A dragged-out trial can result in irreversible damage to a
company’s stock price, rating, or client retention, before a case ever
reaches the verdict. 212

210

Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 312 (2007). Since at least the early 2000s, the
government has adopted a strategy focused on punitive regulations and created the
Corporate Crime Task Force which releases annual scorecards that tally the
numbers of convictions, the total fines, and the number of corporate defendants
charged. Id. The effect of this power to indict and levy destructive fines has been
widely recognized. See generally George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the
Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 985, 987 (2005) (describing corporate
indictment as “lethal even for venerable institutions”); see also United States v.
Stein II, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that by threatening
KPMG with indictment—“the corporate equivalent of capital punishment”—the
government left KPMG no real choice but to pressure its employees to waive their
constitutional rights).
211
United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 142 (2d Cir. 2008).
212
Abbe David Lowell & Christopher D. Man, Federalizing Corporate Internal
Investigations and the Erosion of Employees’ Fifth Amendment Rights, 40 GEO.
L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, vi (2011).
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The post-Enron example of Arthur Andersen Co. stands as a
cautionary tale of a financial services firm that did not cooperate with
the government and went bankrupt213 before the verdict was ever
overturned.214 And the government had not shied away from publicly
predicting the consequences of Andersen’s non-cooperation. At the
time when Anderson picked a fight with the government, a different
bank—Merrill Lynch—decided to instead enter into a settlement
agreement.215 The DOJ’s Assistant Attorney General offered an
insight on the two companies’ standing: “There's a right way and a
wrong way to respond when the government comes knocking at your
door.”216 Clearly, Andersen picked the wrong way.
Unquestionably then, the government exerts pressure on the
corporations to cooperate, but it is not the question of pressure per se
that warrants caution. It is individual, not corporate, rights that are at
stake. After all, criminal subjects are routinely exposed to pressure to
expose wrongdoing.217 It is the degree and type of coercion,
particularly one that erodes constitutional rights of a third party, that
may come in the shadow of such coercion-cooperation models.
Recent caselaw—United States v. Allen and United States v.
Connolly—suggests that federal courts found such infringements had
already occurred.

B.

The Mechanism of Attributing Private Action to
Government in the Fifth-Amendment Context

There is a legal framework for attributing government action
to that of a private actor if the private actor takes on a substantive
function of the government. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Garrity v. New Jersey218 extended the Fifth Amendment privilege

213

Stein II, 440 F. Supp. at 337. Commentators noted finality of reputational
damages of an indictment in a financial services industry is such that even a
Supreme Court’s unanimous reversal of the conviction could not resurrect the firm.
See Ellard, supra note 162, at 211.
214
See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005).
215
Griffin, supra note 211, at 327.
216
Id.at 327 n.80.
217
See Bharara, supra note 196, at 88.
218
385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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against self-incrimination to government employees.219 But the
guarantees against self-incrimination were not always extended to
public employees, let alone the private ones. In Garrity, the Supreme
Court held that “statements obtained under the threat of removal from
office” could not be used in subsequent criminal proceedings against
the defendant.220 The Court found the choice between selfincrimination and job loss, or a threat thereof, coercive,221 stating that
“[t]he option to lose one’s means of livelihood or to pay the penalty
of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or
remain silent.”222
The Court in Garrity based the decision on two constitutional
grounds. First, it held that the coerced choice between job
termination or potentially incriminating testimony violated the
Fourteenth Amendment requirements.223 Second, the Court found
that the state’s threat to fire the officers unless they provided

219

See Donald P. Taylor, Between the Rock and the Whirlpool: Compelled
Statements by Public Employees, 30 LAB. L.J. 148, 150 (2009).
220
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. In Garrity, two police officers in the New Jersey
boroughs were investigated for their ticket-fixing practices and eventually
convicted in two trials of conspiracy to obstruct state motor traffic laws. Id.
During the investigation process, the officers were brought for questioning by the
district attorney, whereby they were each warned that their respective statements
could be used against them in a criminal proceeding. Id. The officers were
informed of their right to remain silent but they were also told that their refusal to
answer questions could result in their removal from office. Id.
221
Id. at 496. By applying a voluntariness test, the Court in Garrity found that the
threat of loss of employment disabled the officers from “making a free and rational
choice.” Id. at 496-98. The Court described the circumstances under which the
defendant was acting as “[w]here the choice is between the rock and the whirlpool,
duress is inherent . . . it always is for the interest of a party under duress to choose
the lesser of two evils. [This] does not exclude duress.” Id. at 498.
222
Id. at 497.
223
Id. at 496. “We now hold the protection of the individual under the Fourteenth
Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal
proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from office, and that it
extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of our body politic.”
Id. at 500.
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statements was an unconstitutional condition.224 Since then, all U.S.
circuits that addressed the issue held that “a government employee
who has been threatened with an adverse employment action by her
employer for failure to answer questions put to her by her employer
receives immunity from the use of her statements or their fruits in
subsequent criminal proceedings.”225
The mechanisms for invoking the Fifth Amendment
protection in situations where government acts through a third-party,
such as corporate counsel conducting an internal investigation,
mimics compelled testimony situations. As in compelled-by-thegovernment situations, the courts also held that, under the Garrity
framework if a defendant shows she was compelled to testify by her
224

Id. Some commentators introduced the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as
an avenue to understand Garrity. See Donald W. Driscoll, Garrity v. New Jersey
and Its Progeny: How Lower Courts Are Weakening the Strong Constitutional
Protections Afforded Police Officers, 22 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 111 (2003). The
doctrine holds that state or federal government cannot offer a benefit on a condition
that a recipient engages in or abstains from an activity that the Constitution
prohibits or that the Constitution prohibits from demanding. Id. at 113 (citing Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 587 (1972)).
225
Sher v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 488 F.3d 489, 501-02 (1st Cir. 2007); see
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 45 F.3d 343, 348 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
statements obtained from an employee under a threat of dismissal were subject to
use and derivative use immunity); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1433 n.13
(9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that the Fifth Amendment
protection against coerced statements extends to public employees who must
choose either to incriminate themselves or to forfeit their jobs during an
administrative hearing.”); United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1256 n.4 (11th
Cir.1998) (“The Fifth Amendment protection afforded by Garrity to an accused
who reasonably believes that he may lose his job if he does not answer
investigation questions is Supreme Court-created and self-executing; it arises by
operation of law; no authority or statute needs to grant it.”); Unifd. Sanitation Men
Ass’n, Inc. v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 1970) (“[T]heir
right, conferred by the Fifth Amendment itself, as construed in Garrity, is simply
that neither what they say under such compulsion nor its fruits can be used against
them in a subsequent prosecution.”); Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578, 581 (5th Cir.
1982) (quoting Luman v. Tanzler, 411 F.2d at 167) (“At the administrative hearing
[the officer] will have a free choice to admit, deny, or refuse to answer. This is full
vindication of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”); Carney
v. City of Springfield, 532 N.E.2d 631, 634 n.5 (Mass. 1988) (citing Garrity to
affirm that “[i]nformal ‘immunity’ under the Fifth Amendment . . . can also arise
where public employees are compelled to answer questions narrowly and
specifically related to their job performance.”). For a comprehensive survey of the
courts’ holdings, see also Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements From. Police
Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1318 n.32 (2001).
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employer acting on behest of the government, the “government must
show that any evidence used or derived has a legitimate source
wholly independent of the compelled testimony.”226
Such
increasingly common scenarios place employees “between the rock
and the whirlpool” where the employee must choose between
potential job loss if she does not answer her employer’s question and
possible self-incrimination if she does. 227
The employee’s protection against answering questions about
his potentially damning conduct are not limitless. If there is no threat
of termination, an employee can be still required to answer even
potentially incriminating questions.228 Companies and governments,
in the case of public employees, have a strong interest in maintaining
internal control and power to speak to their employees in order to
correct mistakes and improve management. Such control need only
be restricted in situations where such information is used for a
potential indictment by a government.
Companies’ counsels should therefore be wary of such
cooperation with the government and strive to protect certain
information. The government, on the other hand, will not be
incapacitated when such protections are put in place.
The
government can always conduct parallel investigations or time the
interviews so that it can speak with an employee before the in-house
counsel, if the government wants to direct the investigations. If the
government still decides to steer the private counsel and compel a
testimony knowing that an employee will be compelled, that is he
will answer under a threat of job loss—implicit or explicit, the
government should simply consider coordinating an appropriate grant
of immunity.

226

United States v. Motes, 551 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 457 (1972)).
227
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 498.
228
See, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968) (“If appellant, a
policeman, had refused to answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly
relating to the performance of his official duties, without being required to waive
his immunity with respect to the use of his answers or the fruits thereof in a
criminal prosecution of himself, Garrity v. New Jersey, supra, the privilege against
self-incrimination would not have been a bar to his dismissal.”).
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The High Costs of Safeguarding A Compelled
Testimony

There are significant costs and unproven efficacy associated
with the current system of handling compelled statements
domestically. Today, the United States’ prosecuting authorities must
grant a compelled witness a use-plus-fruits testimony—also known as
the Kastigar immunity. The Kastigar Court settled on this immunity
requirement to “rational[ly] accommodate[e] between the imperatives
of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel
citizens to testify.”229 A prosecution of a compelled witness therefore
is not foreclosed, as was the case in the first half of the last century.
But if the government decides to prosecute, it must meet the “heavy
burden”230 which is to “prove that the evidence it proposes to use is
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the
compelled testimony.”231
The government’s burden to prove the admissibility of
evidence in compelled testimony situations is much like the coerced
confessions cases. Once the defendant establishes that his testimony
was coerced or compelled, the burden shifts to the government to
establish that the evidence is derived independently from this
confession.232 The government can provide a direct proof to satisfy
this burden—that is to show that the investigatory team has not been
exposed to the compelled evidence. 233 But even if the prosecution’s
team was exposed to the evidence, the prosecution still gets a chance
to prove to the court that this exposure did not “taint” the

229

Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446.
Id. at 461. But see Justice Marshall’s dissent in Kastigar that suggests that the
burden may not be all that heavy for a governmental actor. Id. at 468-69 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
231
Id. at 460.
232
Id. at 461-62.
233
United States v. North I, 910 F.2d 843, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding that
prosecution can discharge its Kastigar burden by showing that the witness was
never exposed to the coerced confession).
230
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investigation.234 However, if the prosecution cannot affirmatively
disprove taint, a court can, depending on the seriousness and timing
of the violation, dismiss the case or reverse a conviction.235

234

United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716, 722 (3d Cir. 1980). Many courts assert
that a mere exposure to the compelled testimony does not taint the prosecuting
team or the witnesses. Id. (“We do not believe that mere access to immunized
grand jury testimony prevents the government from carrying its burden under
Kastigar.”); United States v. North II, 920 F.2d 940, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Some
[witnesses] might convincingly testify that their exposure had no effect on their
trial or grand jury testimony.”). But as pointed out in Section I.D. of this Article,
there is an ongoing and unresolved dispute about the scope of the admissible
evidence under immunity grant.
235
The remedy for a violation of a Kastigar immunity depends on the seriousness
of the violation. A majority of courts agree that where the use of immunized
testimony was harmless, dismissal is not required. See, e.g., United States v.
Schmidgall, 25 F.3d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Serrano, 870
F.2d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that dismissal is not warranted where the use of
immunized testimony was “harmless, beyond reasonable doubt”); United States v.
Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1529 n.8 (11th Cir.1985) (same); United States v. Beery, 678
F.2d 856, 860 n.3 (10th Cir.1982) (same). The courts were split on the issue
whether a grand jury’s exposure to immunized testimony or derivative evidence
warrants a dismissal of the indictment. See, e.g., North I, 910 F.2d at 873 (holding
that where tainted evidence is introduced to the grand jury, “the indictment must be
dismissed”); United States v. Hampton, 775 F.2d 1479, 1490 (11th Cir.1985)
(dismissing an indictment where the government failed to affirmatively show
independent sources); United States v. Palumbo, 897 F.2d 245, 251 (7th Cir. 1990)
(same); United States v. Garrett, 797 F.2d 656, 665 (8th Cir.1986) (same). But see
United States v. Zielezinski, 740 F.2d 727, 729-33 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
indictment by the same jury that was exposed to the compelled testimony or
evidence derived thereof is not an automatic Fifth Amendment violation but instead
requires an evidentiary hearing where the government can prove the evidence was
derived from independent sources); United States v. Garrett, 797 F.2d 656, 663-65
(8th Cir. 1986) (same). The Second Circuit held in United States v. Rivieccio that
the use of compelled testimony before a grand jury does not require dismissal. 919
F.2d 812, 816 n.4 (2d Cir. 1990). But this holding was recently overturned by in
United States v. Allen where Judge Cabranes found that, pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Hubbell, where government made use of the
compelled testimony, a dismissal was required. 864 F.3d 63, 99 (2017) (citing 530
U.S. 27 (2000)). The Supreme Court in Hubbell held that, under the framework in
Kastigar, the respondent’s motion to dismiss the indictment on immunity grounds
must be granted unless the government proves the evidence used in obtaining the
indictment and used in front of a grand jury or at trial was derived from legitimate
and “wholly independent” sources. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45.
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The government developed methods and procedures to carry
the Kastigar-imposed burden and minimize a potential “taint” from a
compelled testimony. For example, a prosecution can attempt to
erect a “wall” around the immunized evidence, to shield the
prosecutors from the contents of the testimony. 236 Independently or
simultaneously with the walls, the government creates “taint” or
“filter” teams—consisting of agents and prosecutors not on a given
case—to segregate materials that contain potential taint. 237 Because
of the rise of multi-national prosecutions and potential taint in foreign
jurisdictions, as an alternative to a taint team, the DOJ has also
embedded DOJ prosecutors into foreign law enforcement

When a prohibited use of an immunized testimony occurs at trial or after trial, a
court usually holds a Kastigar hearing to determine whether the prosecution can
establish independent sources for its evidence. See United States v. Slough, 677 F.
Supp. 2d 112, 130 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The Kastigar hearing may be held ‘pretrial, post-trial, mid-trial (as evidence is offered), or [through] some combination of
these methods . . . .”) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. North, 910
F.2d 843, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). Many courts however favor a pre-trial hearing
because it gives defense broader pretrial discovery. See United States v. Smith,
580 F. Supp. 1418 (D.N.J. 1984); United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th
Cir.1973); United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir.1985). To be entitled to
a hearing, the defendant must lay “a firm ‘foundation’ resting on more than
‘suspicion’” that proffered evidence was tainted by exposure to immunized
testimony. United States v. North II, 920 F.2d 940, 949 n.9 (D.C. Cir.1990)
(quoting Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 348–49 (1958)).
236
See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1989)
(suggesting the building of a “Chinese wall” to prevent taint in a subsequent trial).
In recent years, critics increasingly view the term “Chinese Wall” as culturally
insensitive. American Bar Association recommends using the term “screen” to
denote the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter. See MODEL
CODE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
237
Filter and taint teams are also frequently used to find and insolate attorney-client
privileged materials. See Heidi Boghosian, Taint Teams and Firewalls: Thin
Armor for Attorney-Client Privilege, 1 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL. & ETHICS J. 15, 21
(2003). But federal courts expressed skepticism of the Government’s use of taint
teams to determine whether evidence is protected by the attorney-client privilege.
See Eileen H. Rumfelt, “Taint Team” or Special Master: One Recent Analysis, AM.
BAR
ASS’N
(Sept.
27,
2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/criminal/practice/2018/t
aint-team-or-special-master-one-recent-analysis/. Additionally, the procedure has
been criticized as “fox guarding the chicken coop” because of its frequent failures
to safeguard the privilege. Robert J. Anello & Richard F. Albert, Government
Searches: The Trouble with Taint Teams, 256 N.Y. L.J. 108 (2016).
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departments to promote coordination and avoid inadvertent exposure
to tainted testimony.238
The costs of the procedures that prevent potential taint
increase exponentially with the complexity of the national and
international investigations.239 At same time, questions arise about
the efficiency of the ever-complex procedures to prevent taint. 240
The proponents of transactional immunity argue that taint teams and
taint hearings simply do not grant protections coexistent with the selfincrimination privilege because they allow prosecutors to rely on
non-evidentiary uses of the compelled evidence. 241 They reason that
these precautions cannot prevent a prosecutor from “working
backwards” from what he or she learns in the immunized testimony
to establish an independent source for the prospective evidence 242 or
from “playing off” accomplices against each and using their
respective testimonies as independent sources against each other.243
Lastly, the proponents of transactional immunity also
maintain that mere use-plus-fruits testimony cannot prevent
prosecutors from subconsciously taking the immunized testimony
into account in planning the pre-trial and trial strategy. 244 On the
other hand, the proponents of the use-plus-fruits immunity insist that
the “heavy burden” a government must shoulder in a Kastigar
hearing or a similar process is enough to safeguard against potential
prosecutorial bad faith and “working backwards.”245 Equally, they
238

Carlson, supra note 181, at 309.
Determining compelled testimony taint in a case of a multi-jurisdictional
investigation or a large corporation requires early and complete access to a large,
often seemingly immeasurable, number and types of documents. Such process
requires large expenditures and significant cost-investment in the pre-trial stages.
Id. at 316-17.
240
See Amar & Lettow, supra note 24, at 878-79.
241
See CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 8.11(b) (4th ed. 2020).
242
See State v. Soriano, 684 P.2d 1220, 1232 (1984), aff’d, 693 P.2d 26 (describing
that “[i]t is unrealistic to give a dog a bone and to expect him not to chew on it.”)
(quoting State ex rel. Johnson v. Woodrich, 566 P.2d 859, 861 (1977)); Wright v.
McAdory, 536 So. 2d 897, 903 (Miss. 1988) (explaining it is “inevitable” that
prosecutors under a use/derivative use immunity “will receive incentives to work
backwards from what they learn from the witness.”). See also CRIMINAL PRACTICE
MANUAL § 8.11(b) (4th ed. 2020).
243
See CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 8.11(b) (4th ed. 2020).
244
Kristine Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEX. L.
REV. 791, 807-08 (1978).
245
See CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 8.11(b) (4th ed. 2020).
239
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believe that non-evidentiary use can be avoided by guidelines that
ensure that the prosecutor is not familiar with the testimony 246 and
that prosecutors using immunized testimony against accomplices is
no more than a hypothetical.247
In sum, the taint procedures are expensive, and often
inefficient. And the complexity and costs of anti-taint procedures are
only bound to grow as the examples of globalization of government
prosecutions—such as in Allen—and the privatization of the
government’s investigations—such as in Connolly—profligate,
reflecting the trend of growing international crime of super-national
corporations. The applicability of the Fifth Amendment protections
in these cases should not be questioned, nor restricted to certain types
of evidentiary or non-evidentiary uses. If the government decides to
rely on a foreign government or a private corporation in furnishing
evidence it tends to use in the U.S. prosecutions, it needs to be held to
a higher standard than routinely required to prove that any evidence
was indeed obtained from independent sources, and that the
fundamental Fifth Amendment privileges were not outsourced with
its investigative powers.
IV.

A CASE STUDY OF INCREASING GLOBALIZATION AND
PRIVATIZATION IN THE U.S. PROSECUTIONS: THE GLOBAL
LIBOR SCANDAL

The LIBOR prosecutions showcase the challenges and
possibilities of modern regulatory enforcement, and their impacts on
the employee’s privilege against self-incrimination in the U.S.
courts.248 They are an example of cross-national prosecutions of
transnational financial crime and of a close-knit cooperation between
the prosecuting authority and the banks involved therein. 249
The LIBOR scandal arose from the alleged rigging of the
London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”). LIBOR is an influential
benchmark estimate of the cost of short-term borrowing for large

246

Id.
Id.
248
See infra Parts IV.A, B.
249
See infra notes 268-71, 325-29 and accompanying text.
247
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banks situated in London,250 calculated daily by the British Bankers’
Association (“BBA”) using estimates of the banks’ borrowing rates
submitted by the banks.251 The BBA’s essentially unregulated ratesetting252 came under scrutiny at the height of the financial crisis in
2008 when the rumors of LIBOR’s inaccuracy erupted in a Wall
Street Journal article that alleged that “[m]ajor banks [we]re
contributing to the erratic behavior of a crucial global lending
benchmark” by “reporting significantly lower borrowing costs for . . .
LIBOR.”253 Soon the newspaper articles attracted public attention,
which spurred the BBA to conduct its own investigation.254 Shortly
thereafter, the authorities around the world started their investigations
in the face of mounting public fears of what a loss of credibility in an
important benchmark rate could do to the already faltering financial
markets.255
Because of the interconnectedness of the financial markets
and global presence of the banks involved, LIBOR became the first
truly global investigation: “[a]t least twenty-seven authorities from
250

Milson C. Yu, LIBOR Integrity and Holistic Domestic Enforcement, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2013) (citing JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES,
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 76 (8th ed. 2011)).
251
For a detailed description and analysis of the methodology of LIBOR setting,
see JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 76 (8th ed. 2011).
252
See The Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Final Report, WHEATLEY REV. (Sept.
2012),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/191762/wheatley_review_LIBOR_finalreport_280912.pdf.
The
Wheatley review was written by the newly appointed head of the UK’s Financial
services Authority, Martin Wheatly in which he concluded that LIBOR regulation
needed to be subjected to statutory regulation, not the BBA’s oversight, and
suggested a host of reforms to verify and improve the reliability of submissions.
Id.
253
See Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate,
WALL
ST.
J.
(May
29,
2008,
12:01
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121200703762027135.
254
See David Enrich & Max Colchester, Before Scandal, Clash Over Control of
LIBOR,
WALL.
ST.
J.
(Sept.
11,
2012,
8:08
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239639044384740457763140423532942
4#:~:text=LONDON%E2%80%94Four%20years%20before%20a,the%20world’s
%20most%20important%20number.%22.
255
See Mollenkamp, supra note 254. An interest-rate strategist at Citigroup
published a 2008 report on LIBOR in which he wrote about potential problems
with LIBOR that “the long-term psychological and economic impacts this could
have on the financial market are incalculable.” Id.
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twelve different jurisdictions” joined the investigative efforts.256 The
sprawling investigation posed new challenges to international
cooperation and law enforcement in their joint and parallel
prosecutions of a wide range of misconducts birthed by the LIBOR
scandal—ranging from antitrust violations to fraud. 257
The breadth of the investigation, the multitude of the actors
involved, and the inevitably scattered evidence forced important
probing of the rights and privileges of defendants involved in the
LIBOR prosecutions. With these investigative efforts came new
questions about the scope of the privilege afforded to the defendants
in these complex, global investigations. There are two contexts that
stood out in the LIBOR scandal. The first one was when a foreign
power compels a testimony. 258 This occurred in Allen where the
parallel British authority lawfully compelled testimony, and the U.S
prosecuting authorities that had access to this testimony,
simultaneously conducted their own investigation. The second
question is national in scope, but it concerns the close cooperation
between the banks and the government. The decision in Connolly
highlighted the closeness of cooperation between the prosecuting
authorities and private banks. 259 In such joint ventures, the
government may outsource its investigative powers to private
counsel. Any evidence obtained by the private counsel is therefore
256

Pieter J.F. Huizing, Parallel Enforcement of Rate Rigging: Lessons To Be
Learned From LIBOR, J. ANTITRUST ENF’T, Nov. 2014, at 1-2 n.1 (“The European
Commission, the US Department of Justice (DOJ), the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the US
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the US Federal Reserve, the
Canadian Competition Bureau, the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) (now
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority
(PRA), the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the UK Competition Commission,
the UK Bank of England, the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the Swiss Financial
Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA), the Swiss Competition Commission
(COMCO), the German BaFin, the German Bundesbank, the Netherlands Authority
for the Financial Markets, the Dutch central bank, the Dutch Fiscal Intelligence and
Investigation Service, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the
Japan Financial Services Agency (JFSA), Japan Securities and Exchange
Surveillance Commission, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Securities and
Futures Commission of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the
Chinese National Development and Reform Commission and the China Banking
Regulatory Commission.”).
257
Id. at 2.
258
See infra Part IV.A.
259
See infra notes 325-29 and accompanying text.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

49

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2021], Art. 7

1306

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

subject to Fifth Amendment constraints. 260 Such threats may amount
to compulsion and warrant Fifth Amendment protection.
A.

United States v. Allen

The co-defendants in Allen—Anthony Allen and Anthony
Conti—were British traders from the Rabobank’s London office
prosecuted in the Southern District of New York. The U.S. case
against them, however, arose out of a United Kingdom conduct and a
subsequent investigation by the Financial Conduct Authority
(“FCA”).261 Allen and Conti were responsible for Rabobank’s U.S.
dollar LIBOR submissions and tried in the U.S. for crimes arising
from the manipulation of the LIBOR benchmark rate that impacted
the U.S. markets: wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud
and bank fraud.262
Prior to their New York trial, the FCA, a British equivalent of
the DOJ, carried out a series of compelled interviews of Allen and
Conti pursuant to their statutory authority. 263 Unlike in the United
States, where a compelled interview would be immunized from direct
prosecution as well as prosecution based on the fruits of this
testimony, the United Kingdom only immunized Allen and Conti
from direct prosecution based on their interviews, not prosecution
based on evidence derived thereof.264
The distinction became crucial during the testimony of Paul
Robson, a former Rabobank colleague of Allen and Conti and
Japanese Yen submitter. Robson, who pleaded guilty, 265 became a
crucial cooperating witness for the Unites States’ case against Allen
and Conti.266 Prior to the DOJ action, Robson also had been
investigated by the FCA—an action that was dropped for unknown
260

See infra note 334 and accompanying text.
United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 2017).
262
Id. at 68 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349).
263
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8 § 171 (U.K.) (granting the U.K.’s
Financial Conduct’s Authority the power to compel testimony).
264
Allen, 864 F.3d at 76.
265
Id. at 77.
266
See id. Robson was an important cooperator assisting the DOJ with developing
the case. Id. at 68. For his cooperation, Robson was rewarded with a lenient
sentence with no jail time—only two years of supervised release by U.S. District
Judge Jed Rakoff. Nate Raymond, Ex-Rabobank trader turned U.S. cooperating
witness spared prison, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2016, 3:00 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rabobank-na-libor-idUSKBN1392CO.
261
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reasons—267 where he had learned of relevant testimonial evidence in
the case against him that Allen’s and Conti’s statements were
compelled by the United Kingdom. 268
Allen’s and Conti’s
indictments were based solely on the materials that Robson supplied
to the grand jury.269 Robson’s testimony in the U.S. trial was crucial
for the conviction of Allen and Conti. Aware of the U.S.’s reliance
on evidence provided by Robson, Allen’s and Conti’s lawyers moved
under Kastigar to dismiss the indictments or to suppress Robson’s
testimony.270 Judge Rakoff, however, decided to proceed with a trial
and address the issues in a post-trial Kastigar hearing.271
The post-trial Kastigar hearing revealed that Robson
extensively reviewed and annotated the compelled testimonies not
only before the trial but also prior to giving a statement to the FBI. 272
When testifying at Allen’s and Conti’s trial, the FBI agent then relied
on Robson’s statements made after reading the compelled
testimony.273 Still, it was not clear how. The Second Circuit
precedent was not settled on the question whether Fifth Amendment
protections apply to testimonies compelled by a foreign sovereign.
To be clear, the DOJ took certain precautions against
exposure to the testimony, predicting possible constitutional
challenges against its cooperation with the FCA and knowledge of
the existence of the compelled statements. According to what
became more-or-less a standard operating procedure under
circumstances that deal with coerced evidence, 274 the DOJ held
meetings with the FCA about the need to establish a wall between the
267

Allen, 864 F.3d at 68.
Id. at 77.
269
Id. at 68.
270
Id. at 78.
271
A court can hold a Kastigar hearing pre-, post-, or mid-trial to determine
whether a prohibited use of an immunized testimony occurred and whether the
government can establish an independent source for the evidence introduced at
trial. See generally supra text accompanying note 236.
272
Allen, 864 F.3d at 78.
273
Id. Citing the Kastigar Hearing Transcript, the Second Circuit wrote that Agent
Weeks’ testimony in front of the Grand Jury relied in certain part exclusively on
Robson’s testimony, including allegations that Allen “instructed, specifically
instructed, LIBOR submitters in London to consider the positions and the requests
of Rabobank traders and adjust their submissions for LIBOR and various currencies
based on the means of those traders.” Id.
274
See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text on the prosecutorial use of
walls, prevention of taint, and their relative ineffectiveness.
268
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two agencies to prevent any taint in the DOJ’s case. 275 The series of
meetings hashed out the specific procedures applied in the FCA’s and
the DOJ’s parallel LIBOR investigations. 276 Moreover, the DOJ
created a Filter Team— a team of attorneys from a different section
of the Department who worked on warding off potential taint arising
from the compelled testimonies. 277
Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of New York issued a
decision on the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment or to
suppress Robson’s testimony without deciding the Fifth
Amendment’s applicability to statements compelled by a foreign
power.278 And even if Kastigar protections applied to testimony
compelled by a foreign power, 279 Judge Rakoff found that the
government had met its burden of proof to show that the evidence it
used was derived from wholly independent sources.280 The district
court determined the scope of required Kastigar protections based on
the Second Circuit precedent in United States v. Nanni.281
Specifically, the court held that the DOJ proved its burden by
establishing a “strict and effective wall of separation”282 and showing
an independent source “to wit, [Robson’s] personal experience and
observations,”283 leading to the dismissal of the defendant’s motion
and their conviction.
The Second Circuit reversed Allen’s and Conti’s conviction
on the very Kastigar grounds that the Southern District rejected.
275

United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684, 694-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
Allen, 864 F.3d at 76 (“[T]he FCA agreed to procedures to maintain a ‘wall’
between its investigation and the DOJ’s investigation, including a ‘day one/day
two’ interview procedure in which the DOJ interviewed witnesses prior to the
FCA.”).
277
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on
Kastigar at 2 n.1, United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(No.14-cr-00272-JSR).
278
See Allen, 160 F. Supp 3d at 690 n.8 (stating in a footnote that there was no need
to determine if Kastigar applied to a testimony compelled by a foreign sovereign,
because even in the event it did apply, “the Government has met its Kastigar
burden on the facts here determined”).
279
Id. (stating that although the question of applicability is “deeply interesting,” the
court has no occasion to resolve it here).
280
Id.
281
See 59 F.3d 1425, 1431-32 (2d Cir.1995) (requiring that the government must
make a showing by a preponderance of evidence that the evidence presented at trial
was derived from wholly independent sources).
282
Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 695.
283
Id. at 697.
276
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Judge Cabranes, writing for the majority, discussed in detail not only
the alleged Kastigar violation, but also the applicability of the Fifth
Amendment to evidence compelled by a foreign sovereign. The
court in Allen stated that the imposition of a requirement that
confessions obtained by foreign law enforcements are voluntary has a
significant constitutional footing. 284 Relying on Bram v. United
States,285 the court held that in a criminal trial in the United States,
“wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent
because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by [that] portion of the
fifth amendment . . . commanding that no person ‘shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’”286
The Court further devoted significant detail to distinguishing
the protections guaranteed by the Self-Incrimination clause from
exclusionary rules attached to unreasonable searches and seizures of
the Fourth Amendment.287 Even though courts have sometimes
likened certain features of the Fifth Amendment jurisprudence to the
Fourth Amendment one, the court pointed that the Fourth
Amendment “prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures whether
or not the evidence is sought to be used in a criminal trial.” 288
Quoting the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit pointed out that “the
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved.”289 Because the exclusionary rules are “designed to
prevent United States police officers from relying upon improper
interrogation techniques,”290 such exclusionary rules, according to the
court, “have little, if any, deterrent effect upon foreign police
officers.”291 The court then concluded that because the structures of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are so different, the court did not
apply the Fourth Amendment, inclusive of Miranda jurisprudence, to
foreign authorities.292
284

United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2017).
168 U.S. 532 (1897).
286
Allen, 864 F.3d at 101 n. 70 (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542
(1897)).
287
Id. at 81-83.
288
Id. at 82.
289
Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
290
Id. (quoting United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972)).
291
Id.
292
Id.
285
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The Second Circuit held that because a violation of the
constitutional right against Self-Incrimination only occurs at a
criminal trial, even if a conduct that may impair this right occurs
before the trial, “it naturally follows that, regardless of the origin—
whether domestic or foreign—of a statement, it cannot be admitted at
trial in the United States if the statement was ‘compelled.’” 293
Because the privilege against self-incrimination is derived from the
Constitution and is not an exclusionary remedy, its protections apply
in the American courtrooms regardless whether the statement was
compelled by a foreign power and whether it was done lawfully.
Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment’s constitutional prerogative is
clear and far-reaching—“compelled testimony cannot be used to
secure a conviction in an American court.” 294
On appeal, the U.S. government introduced a “parade of
horribles” that it claimed would ensue if the Fifth Amendment
applied to testimony compelled by foreign sovereigns.
The
government argued that a foreign government could obstruct U.S.
prosecutions by inadvertently divulging a compelled testimony to a
witness or to the public. 295 Worse yet, the government worried, a
hostile government could frustrate the U.S. prosecutions by a simple
act of compelling a defendant and publicizing the testimony. 296
The Second Circuit dismissed the government’s concern of
potential obstruction by foreign sovereigns. The court showed that
the government’s argument was deficient because it failed to account
for the very same danger of obstruction that already exists within the
federal system composed of “State and National Governments.” 297
The court saw no difference between the dangers and benefits that
come with state and federal prosecutions within the U.S. vis-à-vis
parallel prosecutions conducted in private companies and in nation
states.298 Furthermore, the court explained that since the legitimacy
of the United Kingdom’s procedures are not in question in Allen, the
holding in this case shall not foreclose possible prosecutions in
instances where a foreign government indeed attempts to sabotage a
293

Id. at 82 (quoting In re Terrorist Bombing of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552
F.3d 177, 199 (2d Cir. 2008)).
294
Id. at 82.
295
Id. at 87.
296
Id. at 88.
297
Id. at 87 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (internal quotations
omitted)).
298
Id.
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U.S. prosecution.299
The court remarked that even the government observed the
existence of a need for closer cooperation between sovereign
governments because of the perils of the Fifth Amendment. 300
Furthermore, the government was acutely aware that the FCA
transmitted the compelled testimony to their key witness—Robson—
and thus the risk of such coordination should be borne by the United
States’ government, should it decide to pursue the case.301
Lastly, the court in Allen remarked on trends in federal
prosecutions—that cross-border prosecutions such as the one in this
case became more common, making the self-incrimination concerns
more urgent.302 The court noted that cooperation between sovereigns
became not only more frequent, but perhaps already ingrained within
the institutions. For example, U.S. prosecutors are embedded in
foreign law enforcement such as with Eurojust in The Hague and the
International Criminal Police Organization in France, with a vision
also to expand to foreign law enforcement. 303 Because of this new
and expansive enforcement cooperation, the court foreshadowed that
securing witness testimony will be a crucial part of this “brave new
world of international criminal enforcement” because of the conduct,
such as the one in the LIBOR case, that often sprawls continents. 304
However, the Second Circuit affirmed that this expansion shall not
affect the “fairness of our trials at home.” 305 In the court’s words,
marshalling foreign subjects to the U.S. courts “to fend for their
liberty” should not be done without affording these men and women
trial rights that the United States regard as “fundamental”306 and
“absolute.”307
Allen signals the courts’ recognition of the changing
299

Id. at 88.
Id. at 90.
301
Id. at 87-88.
302
Id. at 89.
303
Id. at 89 (introducing as an example the DOJ plan to embed anti-corruption
prosecutors with the FCA in the UK, making it the first time in the history of the
DOJ Criminal Division for a prosecutor to work in a foreign regulatory agency).
304
Id. at 90.
305
Id. (quoting United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 700 (1998)).
306
Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.259, 264 (1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
307
Id. (quoting Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 184 (2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
300
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prosecutorial landscape. 308 The decision surely brings a hurdle to the
international cooperation because the U.S. authorities now know that
Fifth Amendment protections apply abroad. 309 Given, however, the
extent of existing foreign cooperation and the various Filter Teams
and taint-protections that the government used prior to Allen,310 this
decision will hardly add to the burden that the government already
shoulders.
The government expressed concerns that it cannot get
involved at the very early stages of every investigation in every
country that may afford lesser protections than guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment,311 as required by the Second Circuit. 312 But this
concern again ignores the extent to which there already exists a closeknit coordination between the U.S. and other prosecuting
authorities.313
It also simplifies the realities of international coordination.
Foreign conduct so large that it impacts the U.S. market is unlikely to
escape public attention once a foreign power commences
prosecution.
In addition to communication through official
diplomatic channels, the magnitude and publicity surrounding events
impacting global markets, such as the LIBOR scandal, make it
unlikely that the United States government would not notice when a
foreign prosecution commences.
Furthermore, as in federal and state prosecutions, the
government in a foreign prosecution also has an opportunity to
evaluate the merits of the case before it decides to engage, whether to
seek out evidence and witnesses from a parallel investigating entity,
or whether to commence an investigation at all.314 The U.S.
308

See supra notes 297-301 and accompanying text.
See infra note 311.
310
See supra Part III.C.
311
Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc at 15, United
States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-898), reh’g denied, (Nov. 9,
2017), ECF No. 136.
312
Allen, 864 F.3d at 89 (stating that “intimate cooperation and coordination will be
needed between U.S. prosecutors and foreign authorities (or, perhaps the U.S.
prosecutors and U.S. prosecutors on detail to foreign authorities)” to secure witness
testimony).
313
See supra Parts II.D, IV.B; see also supra notes 188-94.
314
See generally Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, Federal/State Criminal
Prosecution Nexus: A Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion, L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 239, 241-44 (describing the evolution and trends in federal and state
prosecution and cooperation and federal prosecutorial discretion).
309
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government is sophisticated enough to know which cooperating
countries and authorities have procedures inconsistent with rights that
need be afforded in the U.S. trials. 315 The government can plan
ahead how to cooperate and properly secure an investigation from
such taint.
The Second Circuit in Allen, however, did not decide the
scope of the taint created by a testimony compelled abroad. The
court addressed instances when a witness’s taint formed the basis of
an indictment, but the court did not rule on the extent of the
protections if the taint was less direct, or perhaps non-evidentiary in
nature, such as occasions where the taint shapes the trial strategy or
cross-examination. An earlier review of the law in different circuits
suggests that there is confusion surrounding the exact difference
between indirect evidentiary taint and non-evidentiary taint.316 But,
given the “fundamental” and “absolute” regard for the fundamental
trial right embodied in the Fifth Amendment, 317 the courts should not
be drawing a hard-and-fast line between evidentiary and nonevidentiary uses.
It is the effect of the use, not the category of the information,
which should determine whether the defendant is placed in the same
position as if she chose not to testify. Therefore, agencies engaging
in foreign prosecutions should, as advised by the Second Circuit in
Allen, carefully examine potential compelled testimony at the very
outset of an investigation and adopt necessary precautions to
minimize, if not eradicate, the potential of any exposure — direct or
indirect.

315

For example, in Canada, a witness cannot refuse to answer a question on the
ground of self-incrimination. The witness receives “a full evidentiary immunity in
return,” but is not guaranteed that this testimony will not be handed over to the
prosecuting authorities in the United States. In the United Kingdom, the chief
financial regulator can compel a witness’s testimony. And in Australia, a witness
receives only use immunity when the prosecuting agency compels her to testify.
See Neal Modi, Toward an International Right Against Self-Incrimination:
Expanding the Fifth Amendment’s “Compelled” to Foreign Compulsion, 103 VA.
L.R. 961, 965-66 (2017).
316
See supra Part II.D.
317
See supra text accompanying note 249; see also supra Part II.A.
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United States v. Connolly

The 2019 Connolly decision from the Southern District of
New York resembles the Second Circuit’s decision in Allen. The
Connolly case involved foreign subjects implicated in the LIBOR
scandal — a U.K. citizen, Gavin Campbell Black, and a U.S. citizen,
Matthew Connolly, working for Deutsche Bank’s London and New
York offices, respectively. Similar to the defendants in Allen,
Connolly and Black were indicted in the Southern District in 2016 for
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, bank fraud, and substantive counts
of fraud alleging a scheme to manipulate the LIBOR interest rate for
personal gains.318
The United States’ investigation into Deutsche Bank and
LIBOR submitters’ Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”), which commenced at the height of the LIBOR scandal,
long preceded Black’s and Connolly’s eventual indictment. 319 On
April 19, 2010, the CFTC sent a letter to Deutsche Bank’s General
Counsel, Joseph Polizzotto, advising Deutsche Bank that it
“‘expect[ed]’ the Bank to ‘cooperate fully’ with its investigation.” 320
Attached to the letter to Mr. Polizzoto, and consistent with the
government’s strong incentivizing of cooperation, 321 was a CFTC
Enforcement Advisory Memorandum. 322 The Memorandum advised
that a corporation may receive a cooperation credit if it makes
“employee or other relevant corporate documents available in a
timely manner.”323
The Deutsche Bank’s counsel complied with the demands.324
Looking back at this cooperation, the counsel for Paul Weiss testified
at Black’s and Connolly’s trials that there was nothing “voluntary”
about the investigation that followed the receipt of the government’s
letter.325 To avoid penalties, and possible irreversible damage from
an indictment, Deutsche Bank broadened the scope of Paul Weiss’s

318

No. 16 Cr. 0370, 2019 WL 2120523, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019).
Id. at *1-2.
320
Id. at *2.
321
See supra notes 188-94 for an overview of the federal government’s settlement
policy.
322
Connolly, 2019 WL 2120523, at *2.
323
Id.
324
Id.
325
Id.
319
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representation to include investigating allegations in connection to
LIBOR which “was demanded (not requested) by the CFTC.”326
The cooperation between Deutsche Bank’s counsel and the
government agencies—including the CFTC, the SEC, and eventually
the DOJ—was so extensive327 that it raised questions as to what
extent, if at all, did the government conduct its investigatory job of
Deutsche Bank at the outset of the investigation. 328 The federal
agencies were present and coordinating the investigation with Paul
Weiss from the very beginning, and they remained involved
throughout the years of internal investigation. 329 During this time,
the government was “kept abreast of developments on a regular
basis,” and “gave considerable direction to the investigating Paul
Weiss attorneys, both about what to do and how to do it.” 330
During the course of the investigation, and in addition to
numerous document and interview requests, the CFTC “asked” Paul
Weiss to identify and host additional in-person interviews with three
Deutsche Bank employees, including Black, as well as anyone these
three employees interacted with. 331 Paul Weiss interviewed Black
again in 2011, 2012, and 2014.332 At the fourth interview in 2014,
Deutsche Bank went as far as “ask[ing] the Government for
‘permission’ to interview its own employee.”333 Over the years,
Black could not refuse to talk to Deutsche Bank’s investigative team
326

Id.
The 2015 Paul Weiss “White Paper” summarizes, in broad terms, the extent of
Deutsche Bank’s cooperation.
327

During the course of Deutsche Bank’s nearly five-year internal
investigation, Paul Weiss lawyers conducted nearly 200 interviews of
more than fifty Bank employees-including, of course, of Black-and
shared the results of these interviews with the Government. In addition
to conducting interviews, Paul Weiss extracted and reviewed 158 million
electronic documents, as well as listened to 850,00 audio files, or over
hundreds of thousands of hours of audio tapes.

Id. at *7 (internal citations omitted).
328
Id. at *12 (“In other words, Paul Weiss did everything that the Government
could, should, and would have done had the Government been doing its own work.
The fact that the record contains very little evidence about the Government’s own
independent investigative efforts during the first three years of Deutsche Bank’s
“voluntary” investigation renders that inference all the more compelling. . . .”).
329
Id. at *2.
330
Id.
331
Id. at *3.
332
Id. at *4-6.
333
Id. at *6.
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if he wished to retain his job.334 Because of this extensive
cooperation between the government and Deutsche Bank’s counsel,
the court found that the government had outsourced its investigative
powers, requiring the application of the Garrity standard to private
conduct.335
Despite attributing the government’s action to Paul Weiss’s
compelled interviews on behalf of Deutsche Bank, the district court
held that the government’s use of Black’s compelled interview did
not constitute a Kastigar violation.336 The court added that even if
there was a Kastigar violation, it was harmless error.337 This is
because it is an established principle that “‘Garrity immunity
automatically attache[s]’ where an employer makes a sufficiently
clear and direct threat that it will take an adverse employment action
against a public employee.”338 In other words, even though the
immunity attached to Black’s compelled interviews with Paul Weiss,
the court found that the Government’s use of the compelled
interviews did not violate Black’s Kastigar rights.
By way of example, the court listed certain direct and indirect
uses that are against Kastigar’s mandate, such as “obtaining [an]
indictment based on tainted evidence,” 339 “preparing [the
Government’s case for trial,”340 or “presenting tainted evidence to the

Deutsche Banks’s employee policy provided that an “employee ‘must fully
cooperate with Compliance and other appropriate Deutsche Bank departments (e.g.,
legal, Group Audit, etc.) handling internal and external examinations,
investigations and other reviews involving Deutsche Bank, its customers and other
related company activities.’” Id. at *3 (internal citation omitted). The policy did
not provide for express termination in the case of non-cooperation, but such a threat
was within the contemplated sanctions. Id. (“Employees who violate Deutsche
Bank’s policies may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including
termination of employment.”).
335
Id. at *10. The Garrity rule applies where “‘there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the state and the challenged action.’” Id. Judge McMahon found that the
record established this nexus, because “Deutsche Bank’s interviews of Gavin
Black, or which he was compelled to sit under threat of termination, are fairly
attributable to the Government.” Id. at *14. See also supra Part III.B (regarding
the mechanism of attributing private action to the government).
336
Id. at *1.
337
Id. at *22.
338
Id. at *16 (quoting United States v. Palmquist, 712 F.3d 640, 646 (1st Cir.
2013)).
339
Id. at *21 (quoting United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45 (2000)).
340
Id. (quoting United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45 (2000)).
334
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grand jury.”341 Yet, the court concluded that, despite government
outsourcing, the defendants failed to lay a sufficiently “firm
foundation” to support their theory of a Kastigar violation342 and the
Government successfully carried its burden to show that its evidence
was derived from independent sources.343
Similar to the district court in Allen,344 the court in Connolly
relied on the Second Circuit’s decisions in Riveccio and Nanni in
determining that the degree of prohibited use of Black’s testimony
was “merely tangential”345 and as such did not “influence[] the
[G]overnment’s decision to pursue its line of investigation.” 346 This
conclusion rested on the court’s finding that: no direct evidence of
Black’s testimony was admitted as evidence in the trial, the
government did not use Black’s false exculpatory indirectly, and
none of the 3,500 material witnesses the government called contained
information that would suggest that the government discussed
Black’s testimony with them. 347 The court rejected Black’s counsel’s
theory of taint that the government relied on Black’s initial
interview’s with Deutsche Bank’s counsel “to gain an understanding
of the LIBOR process, identify evidence, and develop investigative
leads” as non-evidentiary, and not protected under the Fifth
Amendment.348
However, the court agreed that the inquiry under Kastigar
immunity is not based on the categorical content of the testimony, but
rather on “the ways in which they influenced the Government’s
case.”349 Listing the impermissible uses of immunized testimony, the
court included an example of false denials that could be “‘‘used’
against [defendants] in the sense that’ such denials might ‘provide[]
the motivation for’ cooperating witness to testify.” 350 An additional
impermissible use of an immunized testimony may be to “tip off a
341

Id. (quoting United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 377 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
Id. at *12. The court did not specify what would constitute a sufficient
foundation that would entitle the defendant to a Kastigar hearing.
343
Id. at *22-23.
344
See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
345
Connolly, 2019 WL 2120523, at *2.
346
Id. at *21 (quoting United States v. Riveccio, 919 F.2d 812, 815 & n.3 (2d. Cir.
1990)).
347
Id. (quoting United States v. Nanni, 59 F.3d 1432, 1432 (2d Cir. 1995)).
348
Id. at *19.
349
Id. at *18 (citing United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
350
Id. (quoting Uniting States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 689 (2d Cir. 1990)).
342
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grand jury that a defendant’s testimony is not credible.” 351 The
court’s examples show the thin line drawn between evidentiary and
non-evidentiary uses. For example, the use of compelled testimony
to motivate co-conspirators would be, at least in some circumstances,
considered a non-evidentiary use.352 This, in turn, has been rejected
by many courts as prohibited use per se under Kastigar.353
The court’s analysis of what constitutes impermissible use
underscores an important point about the scope of the selfincrimination privilege as interpreted in the light of its historical
importance recognized in Garrity, Kastigar, Hubbell, and Allen. The
use of categorical nomenclature, such as evidentiary and nonevidentiary, restricts the breadth of the inquiry under the Fifth
Amendment that is necessary to preserve its protections.
An inquiry under the Fifth Amendment consistent with the
courts’ expansive reading of it should turn on whether the evidence is
“testimonial” in character 354 and whether the use of the immunity has
“le[ft] the witness and the Federal Government in substantially the
same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the
absence of a grant of immunity.”355 Preserving this inquiry is
especially important as the breadth and the methods of government
prosecutions evolve nationally and globally.
Categorizing
information based on evidentiary and non-evidentiary uses cannot
capture the multitude of ways a government can be exposed to
compelled evidence – whether it is from private firms or other
governments – nor can it keep up with the rapid evolution of the
investigative and enforcement methods.
The court’s holding in Connolly also signaled an important
change in ways how courts may view large corporate internal
investigations conducted by a private counsel at the government’s

351

Id. (citing United States v. Cortese, 568 F. Supp. 119, 131-32 (M.D. Pa. 1983)).
See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
353
See supra Part II.D.
354
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000).
355
Id. at 40 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1972)).
352
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behest.356 The eagerness of the firms to cooperate with the
government and furnish the most, and the best, information regarding
potential wrongdoings was as much a survival strategy on the part of
the banks which desired a favorable strategy as it was the
Government’s strategy to outsource large parts of complex
investigations and gain vital information needed to increase the
number of individual corporate convictions. 357 But the strategy
seems to have led to plea deals with potentially guilty actors to secure
convictions of the middle-rank employees,358 and it also eroded the
Fifth Amendment constitutional protections of those thrown in the
crosshairs.
Yet, in the aftermath of Allen and Black, the government may
have to be more cautious in the way it conducts its investigations.
Connolly signals that the courts may begin to more closely scrutinize
the government’s communications and any cooperation with, or
instanced outsourcing investigations to, private actors.359 Because
the outer bounds of what constitutes a prohibited use of compelled
testimony under Kastigar are undefined by the courts, and many uses
do not even squarely fit with the current framework operating within
the evidentiary and non-evidentiary categories, courts could – and
should – subject every use to an effect inquiry, asking to what extent
did the use change the defendant’s situation. The government and
private counsels will therefore have to closely monitor the extent of
their cooperation and implement new safeguards in interviews
conducted at the government’s request in order to ensure the
preservation of employees’ privilege against self-incrimination.

356

See Connolly, 2019 WL 2120523, at *1 (citing Abbe David Lowell &
Christopher D. Man, Federalizing Corporate Internal Investigations and the
Erosion of Employees’ Fifth Amendment Rights, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM.
PROC. iii (2011)). Judge McMahon acknowledged that there are “profound
implications if the Government . . . is routinely outsourcing its investigations into
complex financial matters to the targets of those investigations, who are in a
uniquely coercive position vis-à-vis potential targets of criminal activity.” Id.
357
See supra Part III.A on the privatization of government investigations.
358
See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
359
See S.D.N.Y. Decision May Have Outsized Implications on DOJ’s
“Outsourcing” of Investigations, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP.
(May 8, 2019), https://www.quinnemanuel.com/media/1419441/sdny-decisionmay-have-outsized-implications-on-doj-s-outsourcing-of-investigations.pdf.
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CONCLUSION

The global reach of international business facilitated the
growth and impact of both international financial crime and
international prosecutions. 360
Corporate eagerness to settle
misconduct tightened cooperation between the government and
corporate entities.361 The government’s need to identify individual
culprits of large misconduct, and corporate eagerness to avoid
ruinous consequences of a potential dragged-out trial, grew into a
mode of cooperation where the government conditioned favorable
settlements on corporate willingness to cooperate on government’s
terms. Globally, the government also began to rely on information
supplied by foreign sovereigns to conduct its own investigations. 362
Connolly and Allen are examples of the prosecution trends in cases
that become globalized, privatized, and more complex.
The globalization and privatization of the government’s
investigations endanger the protections granted by the Fifth
Amendment in the United States. The government’s actions become
obscured by the complexity of the crime, numerosity of the actors
cooperating with (or acting on behalf of) the government, and
uncertainties about the scope of the self-incrimination privilege.
Thus, the government can hide its conduct behind actions of a
corporation or a sovereign. As a second line of defense, it can also,
after receiving volumes of information from a different government
or a corporation, argue that its use of a testimony was “nonevidentiary.” Such prosecutions go against the historical importance
of the Fifth Amendment as well as against precedent that placed great
value on the Fifth Amendment’s ability to protect individuals from
overzealous government actions. Thus, the rights of an individual
become weakened by getting caught in the midst of much larger, and
better-informed, governments and multi-national corporations each
pursuing its own goals.
The law should not get blind-sided by these developments,
and adequate protections should be required from the government
when it cooperates with foreign governments or outsources any of its
investigative functions into private hands. At the same time, to
counteract this change, the courts need to scrutinize this “brave new
360

See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.C.
362
See supra Part IV.A.
361

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/7

64

Resar Krasulova: Globalization and Privatization

2021

GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION

1321

world”363 of prosecution with more flexible standards of review.
Kastigar did not set the exact boundaries for what is an
impermissible testimonial use. Rather, the standard is flexible,
allowing for readjustment and re-alignment in the face of developing
prosecution trends. Courts should therefore rid themselves of the
imprecise and obscure terminology that connects constitutionality
with evidentiary and non-evidentiary terminology; instead, they
should use an open-ended inquiry that will allow for evaluating each
use of a compelled testimony on a case-by-case basis.

363

United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 (2d Cir. 2017).
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